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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN UNITED
STATES COURTS
Gary Born*
Abstract: Over the past two decades, the status of customary international law in U.S.
courts has been the subject of vigorous debate. On the one hand, proponents of the “modernist”
position contend that rules of customary international law are presumptively rules of federal
law, which apply directly in U.S. courts and preempt inconsistent state law even in the absence
of federal legislative or executive authorization. On the other hand, the “revisionists” argue
that, in the absence of congressional legislation or a U.S. treaty, rules of customary
international law are generally not matters of federal law, and will therefore generally be
governed by state law. This Article argues for an approach that rejects central elements of both
the modernist and revisionist positions, while also adopting other aspects of both positions.
The Article contends that the text, structure, and objectives of the Constitution, and the weight
of judicial authority, require treating all rules of customary international law as rules of federal
law, but that such rules will be directly applicable in U.S. courts only when the federal political
branches have expressly or impliedly provided for judicial application of a particular rule.
This approach would mirror the way in which courts apply U.S. treaties and other
international agreements—treating them as matters of federal law but applying their provisions
in U.S. courts only to the extent authorized by the political branches. The intentions of the
political branches regarding application of particular rules of customary international law by
U.S. courts can be deduced from a number of indicia, analogous to those applied to determine
whether particular treaty provisions are self-executing; these include the content and character
of the relevant rule of international law, statements by the Executive or Legislative branch, and
the content, character, and historical treatment of related rules of international law.
The position proposed in this Article produces materially different results from either the
modernist or the revisionist approaches. In many cases, the analysis proposed in this Article
will lead to the conclusion that particular customary international law rules—such as head of
state or consular immunity and attribution of state responsibility—are directly applicable in
U.S. courts, notwithstanding the absence of express authorization by the political branches. In
other cases, including many emerging human rights protections, this analysis will lead to a
conclusion that particular rules of customary international law are not applicable in U.S. courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Few issues of international law have attracted more attention, or
inspired greater fervor, in the United States than the status of customary
international law in U.S. courts. Contemporary commentators and courts
have written prolifically on whether rules of customary international law
are governed by U.S. federal law or U.S. state law and when these rules
may be applied by U.S. courts. These various authorities have arrived at
widely differing, and largely irreconcilable, answers to these questions.
Citing constitutional text and judicial precedent, an extensive body of
authority has concluded that rules of customary international law are
presumptively rules of federal law, which apply directly in U.S. courts
and preempt inconsistent state law even in the absence of federal
legislative or executive authorization. Citing other constitutional
provisions and judicial precedent, another body of authority has
concluded that, in the absence of congressional legislation or a U.S. treaty,
rules of customary international law will generally be matters of state law.
A third body of commentary proposes other approaches, suggesting that
customary international law be treated either as a form of general common
law (subject to independent development in state and federal courts) or a
sui generis category of “non-preemptive federal law.”
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None of these approaches is consistent with the text, structure, and
objectives of the Constitution, judicial authority, or sound policy. The
modern position, which presumptively regards all customary international
law as federal common law, directly applicable in U.S. courts, ignores
critical limitations on federal courts’ lawmaking authority, particularly in
a field implicating the Nation’s foreign relations. Conversely, the socalled revisionist view, which generally results in customary international
law being treated as state law, accords insufficient importance to federal
authority over U.S. foreign relations and the manner in which those
relations are conducted. For similar reasons, the alternatives proposed by
other commentators would produce results that are inconsistent with both
the Constitution and judicial authority.
This Article argues for an approach that rejects central elements of both
the modernist and revisionist positions, while also adopting other aspects
of those positions. The Article contends that the text, structure, and
objectives of the Constitution, and the weight of judicial authority, require
treating all rules of customary international law as rules of federal law,
but that such rules will be directly applicable in U.S. courts only when the
federal political branches have expressly or impliedly provided for
judicial application of a particular rule. This ensures that all customary
international law rules, binding on the United States internationally, are
rules of federal law, subject to uniform application and interpretation by
federal courts. At the same time, this approach ensures that particular rules
of customary international law, like provisions of treaties and other
international agreements, will be directly applicable in U.S. courts when,
but only when, the U.S. political branches have so provided.
This approach is mandated by the text, structure, and objectives of the
Constitution, which provide the federal government, as distinguished
from the several states, with broad authority over U.S. foreign relations.
This expansive federal authority reflects a compelling need for the United
States to speak internationally with “one voice,” particularly regarding the
content of international law and the Nation’s international obligations.
Given this, the revisionists’ conclusion that rules of international law are
generally matters of state law would violate the Constitution’s allocation
of foreign affairs power and work serious damage to the political
branches’ ability to conduct U.S. foreign relations. Conversely, the
Constitution limits the federal courts’ authority independently to make
and apply federal law, proscribing any judicially-created “general
common law.” Given these limits, and the risks of judicial interference in
U.S. foreign relations, the modernist position that virtually all rules of
customary international law are directly applicable in U.S. courts,
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regardless of the intentions of the U.S. political branches, is also
untenable.
Although judicial authority is diverse, it is most consistent with treating
all rules of customary international law as rules of federal law, but also
with particular rules of international law applying directly in U.S. courts
only when the federal political branches have expressly or impliedly
provided for such judicial application. Thus, U.S. courts have applied
rules of customary international law in countless cases since the founding
of the Republic, but have consistently refused to do so without sufficient
indication of political branch intent—effectively treating customary
international law rules in the same manner as U.S. treaties and other
international agreements. Likewise, particularly since Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins1 gave the issue importance, U.S. courts have treated rules of
customary international law as rules of federal law. In practice, this
approach has ensured federal supremacy over issues of international law
while preventing unauthorized judicial law-making or interference in U.S.
foreign relations.
This Article argues that, consistent with the text, structure, and
objectives of the Constitution and judicial authority, all rules of customary
international law have the status of federal law. It also argues, however,
that the question whether a particular rule of customary international law
is directly applicable in U.S. courts depends, as with U.S. treaties and
other international agreements, on a separate inquiry into whether the
federal political branches have expressly or impliedly provided for
judicial application of that rule. The Article contends, again as with
treaties, that the intentions of the political branches are deducible from a
number of indicia, analogous to those applied to determine whether
particular treaty provisions are self-executing; these indicia include the
content and character of the relevant rule of international law, statements
by the Executive or Legislative branch, and the content, character, and
historical treatment of related rules of international law.
The position proposed in this Article produces materially different
results from either the modern or the revisionist approaches. All rules of
customary international law would be treated as federal law, thus
providing for a more expansive body of federal law than the modernist (or
revisionist) position; at the same time, the Article’s approach results in
more frequent application of customary international law in U.S. courts
than urged by revisionists, but less frequent application than under the
modernist position. In many cases, the analysis proposed in this Article
will lead to the conclusion that particular customary international law

1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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rules—such as head of state or consular immunity and attribution of state
responsibility—are directly applicable in U.S. courts, notwithstanding the
absence of express authorization by the political branches. In other cases,
including many emerging human rights protections, this analysis will lead
to a conclusion that particular rules of international law are not applicable
in U.S. courts.
Part I of this Article describes the current status of customary
international law in U.S. courts, outlining the modernist position, the
revisionist view, and the alternative positions. Part II critiques the
treatment of international law under existing analyses, arguing that the
modern and revisionist positions are both flawed in critical respects. Part
III proposes an alternative approach to the subject, adopting aspects of
both the modern and revisionist positions.
I.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS

Until the turn of this century, the status of customary international law
in U.S. courts was of only occasional, and usually passing, interest.
Although courts frequently applied rules of customary international law,
the question whether these rules were state, or federal, law seldom arose.
Rather, the so-called “modernist position” was that customary
international law is federal law, directly applicable in U.S. courts and
prevailing over inconsistent state law. This position was codified in 1987
by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States,2 reflecting what was regarded at the time as “an ‘unquestioned’
principle of the law of foreign relations.”3
The modernist position was not only questioned, but vigorously
challenged, by Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and other “revisionists” in
the late 1990s.4 Their work challenged the constitutionality of the
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (AM. LAW
INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority and the Preemptive Power of International Law,
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295.
4. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception,
51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 543–44 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Breard]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming
Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86
GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts—Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
807, 809 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849 (1997) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts
and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley &
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modernist position, arguing that rules of customary international law lack
the status of federal law unless expressly adopted by congressional
legislation or a U.S. treaty. The revisionists disputed assertions that
customary international law had historically been regarded as federal law,
as well as claims that international law could legitimately take the form
of judge-made federal common law. In their words, customary
international law “does not have the status of federal common law.”5
The revisionist critique was met by a vigorous defense of the modernist
position.6 The modernists argued that the revisionist position ignored the
historical role of U.S. courts in applying international law7 and would
produce incongruous results, with different state courts adopting
conflicting positions on the content of international law rules.8 In the
words of one modernist, “[t]reating international law as some species of
state law does not foster original intent, states’ rights, judicial restraint,
executive discretion, or democratic decisionmaking.”9
Judicial decisions mirrored the modernist and revisionist positions,
with different lower courts adopting different positions on the status of
customary international law.10 The Supreme Court eventually addressed
Goldsmith, Federal Courts]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International
Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Pinochet]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 332 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Human
Rights]; Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) [hereinafter Bradley,
Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance]. There had been earlier indications of dissent from the
modern position, but these attracted limited attention. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts,
and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Weisburd, State Courts]; Phillip
R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986)
[hereinafter Trimble, A Revisionist View].
5. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821.
6. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825
(1998) [hereinafter Koh, State Law?]; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 383
(1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After
Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 395–96 (1997) [hereinafter Stephens, Law of our Land]; Carlos M.
Vasquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate
Positions and A Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1498–1500 (2011).
7. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1827 (“[E]ven casual reflection compels the conclusion that
Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken.”).
8. Id. at 1827–29.
9. Id. at 1861.
10. Compare Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (“settled proposition that federal
common law incorporates international law”), Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos Human
Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is . . . well settled that the law of nations is part
of federal common law.”), and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“[I]nternational law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress.”), with
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the issue,11 but did so inconclusively,12 with both the modernists and
revisionists seizing on the Court’s decision as vindication of their
positions.13 Lower courts have responded similarly, continuing to reach
inconsistent decisions about the status of customary international law.14
At the same time, the modernists and revisionists have both moderated
their positions in some respects, edging modestly toward common ground,
but ultimately producing neither meaningful consensus nor analytical
clarity.15
As discussed below, this treatment of customary international law in
U.S. courts is dysfunctional. It has produced, and continues to produce,
uncertainty about the character and sources of international law in the
United States and the circumstances in which international law will be
applied by U.S. courts. This uncertainty about basic issues of domestic
constitutional authority and the relationship between U.S. and
international law risks interference with U.S. foreign relations, undercuts
the role of U.S. courts in the development of international law, and
imposes serious costs on litigants and lower courts. More fundamentally,
as both revisionists and modernists have recognized, resolving this

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Only when
international-law principles are incorporated into a statute or a self-executing treaty do they become
domestic U.S. law enforceable in U.S. courts.”), Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146–47
(D.C. Cir. 2003), Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810–23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
11. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728–31, 734–35 (2004).
12. Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV.
F. 28, 28 (2007) (“Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has become
something of a Rorschach blot . . . .”).
13. Compare Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 533–38 (2004), and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying
One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2255 (2004), with Bradley, Goldsmith &
Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 892–93.
14. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 13 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[S]tatutes and self-executing treaties
are domestic U.S. law and thus enforceable in U.S. courts. By contrast, non-self-executing treaties
and customary international law are not domestic U.S. law.”); Jovic v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 69 F. Supp.
3d 750, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“‘Laws’ in the context of Section 1331 includes federal common law,
which includes the laws of nations or customary international law.”); Tarros S.p.A. v. United States,
982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“courts may no longer create ‘general’ federal
common law, and are restricted to ‘limited enclaves’ where Congress has authorized its creation[,]”
such as the Alien Tort Statute).
15. See infra section II.A.1 (some revisionists appear to accept expanded concept of political
branch authorization of judicial application of customary international law); infra section II.A.1; infra
note 135; infra section III.A (some modernists appear to limit types of customary international law
rules that are judicially applicable).

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1648

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

uncertainty, and the debate giving rise to it, is essential in “a democratic
society increasingly governed by international law.”16
A.

The Modernists: “The Modern View Is that Customary
International Law Is Federal Law and Its Determination by the
Federal Courts Is Binding on the State Courts”

The modernists’ position is superficially straightforward: all rules of
customary international law are rules of federal law, directly applicable in
U.S. courts. In the words of the Third Restatement, “the modern view is
that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its
determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”17 As a
consequence, although there is no “canonical account” of the modern
position,18 it generally holds that all customary international law rules are
judicially applicable and prevail over state law: “[a]ny rule of customary
international law, is federal law (§ 111), [and] it supersedes inconsistent
State law or policy whether adopted earlier or later.”19 For the same
reason, claims based on customary international law “aris[e] under”
federal law for purposes of Article III and statutory federal question
jurisdiction.20
The modern position is unequivocal in asserting that all rules of
customary international law are presumptively applicable in U.S. courts,
without the need for implementing legislation or further acts of the
political branches.21 Thus, “[i]nternational law . . . is ‘self-executing’ and
is applied by courts in the United States without any need for it to be
enacted or implemented by Congress.”22 This position assertedly applies
to all customary international law rules, which, as discussed below,23
16. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821; see also Koh, State Law?, supra
note 6, at 1855; Neuman, supra note 6, at 389.
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 3.
18. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 849.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115 cmt. e; see also Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over
Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 377 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Sorting Out]
(“[C]ustomary international law is ‘supreme’ in its relation to state law.”); Koh, State Law?, supra
note 6, at 1825 (“[I]nternational law, as applied in the United States, must be federal law.”).
20. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559–
60 (1984) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law as Law]; Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 378.
21. Some modernists envisage some (limited) constraints on the types of customary international
law rules that are directly applicable in U.S. courts. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1835 (“Once
customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate them into
federal common law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
22. Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 20, at 1561.
23. See infra section II.A.1.
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extend to a wide range of subjects. Thus, regardless of their character
“customary international law is always federal law and always displaces
[state] law, without consideration of the nature of the particular rule at
issue.”24
The modernist position recognizes, of course, that customary
international law may be overridden by subsequent federal legislation.25
Where Congress does not legislate to the contrary, however, the modern
position provides that customary international law, as interpreted by the
federal courts, is the supreme law of the land and preempts state law.26 As
Professor Neuman summarizes the modern position: “[t]he existence and
content of rules of customary international law that are binding on the
United States is to be determined as a matter of federal law. Such rules
are presumptively incorporated into the U.S. domestic legal system and
given effect as rules of federal law.”27
Although the consequences of the modern position are straightforward,
the basis for that position is less clear. The explanation most widely
endorsed by modernists is that customary international law is federal
common law,28 analogous to the rule adopted in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino.29 On this theory, the federal courts possess authority to
incorporate international law into U.S. federal law by virtue of the
uniquely federal interests in the Nation’s foreign relations30 and the
historic practice of federal courts applying customary international law as
24. Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 437.
25. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 384 (“Our system follows a practice of presumptive enforceability
of customary international law, subject to congressional override.”); Koh, State Law?, supra note 6,
at 1835 (“Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively
incorporate them into federal common law, unless the norms have been ousted as law for the United
States by contrary federal directives.”).
26. Neuman, supra note 6, at 383 (“[T]he modern position entails the conclusion that, in the face
of congressional silence, customary international law will be supreme over the laws of the States.”).
27. Id. at 376.
28. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1835 (“[F]ederal courts retain legitimate authority to
incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into federal common law.”); Neuman,
supra note 6, at 376 n.31.
Other modernists conclude that customary international law rules “resemble,” but are not identical
to, federal common law rules. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876, 878 (1987) (customary
international law “resembles” or “is like” federal common law); cf. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at
1835 n.61 (“[C]ustomary international law is federal common law (not simply ‘like federal common
law’).”).
29. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
30. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1838 (“[T]he capacity of federal courts to incorporate
customary international law into federal law—unless ousted by contrary federal directive—is
absolutely critical to maintaining the coherence of federal law in areas of international concern.”).
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“part of our Law.”31 Thus, as one court put it, “the law of nations . . . has
always been part of the federal common law . . . . International law has an
existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress.”32 And, as
detailed above, the modernists would apply this analysis to all rules of
customary international law: simply by virtue of a rule’s status as
customary international law, it also acquires the status of federal common
law, directly applicable in U.S. courts.
B.

The Revisionists: Customary International Law “Does Not Have
the Status of Federal Common Law”

There is also no canonical account of the revisionist position. Stated
most simply, the revisionists’ claim is that the modernists are wrong and
that customary international law “does not have the status of federal
common law.”33 More specifically, the revisionists reason that customary
international law was not included in Article VI’s catalogue of sources of
federal law,34 and that, absent authorization by treaty or statute, under
Article VI, federal judges lack the authority to make (or find) rules of
international law or to incorporate these rules into U.S. law.35 Thus, “the
judicial federalization of all [customary international law] requires some
authorization from the Constitution or a federal statute.”36
The revisionists contend that, for much of the Nation’s history,
customary international law was not regarded as federal law. Instead,
international law was part of the “general common law,” which, during
the era of Swift v. Tyson,37 was neither state nor federal law, and which
federal and state courts were, in principle, free to interpret in independent,
potentially conflicting ways. As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith
conclude, “[customary international law] was not viewed as federal law
during most of our nation’s history.”38
The centerpiece of the revisionists’ position is Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins and its declaration that, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1838 n.23.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980).
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 850.
Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 354.
41 U.S. 1 (1938).
Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 332.
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case is the law of the state.”39 According to the revisionists, absent an
applicable federal statute (or U.S. treaty), Erie forbids federal courts from
independently making or applying rules of “general” common law:
“[federal] courts should not apply [customary international law] as federal
law unless authorized to do so by the federal political branches.”40
Applying this standard, the revisionists required an express statement, in
either a treaty or federal legislation, that a rule of customary international
law had been incorporated into federal law.41 They reasoned that this was
necessitated by “well-accepted notions of American representative
democracy, federal common law, separation of powers, and federalism.”42
More recently, some revisionists have suggested less demanding
standards of political branch incorporation of international law, although
even these still require “at least to some degree, [a showing of] political
branch authorization.”43
The revisionists acknowledge that the political branches may, and
frequently have, incorporated particular rules of international law into
federal law, citing the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Alien Tort
Statute, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.44 But the revisionist
position denies that Congress has incorporated all (or very many)
customary international law rules into federal law. In their words,
“Congress has never purported to incorporate all of [customary

39. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Justice Brandeis would of course have meant
to include treaties concluded pursuant to Article I, but his focus was on domestic, rather than
international, matters.
40. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 319.
41. Bradley, Breard, supra note 4, at 543 (“treaty or statute”); Bradley & Goldsmith, Human
Rights, supra note 4, at 355 (“federal treaty or statute”); Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law,
supra note 4, at 819–20 (contemplating political branch authorization only by legislation or treaty);
id. at 868–69 (endorsing “plain statement” requirement); Trimble, A Revisionist View, supra note 4,
at 716.
42. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 821.
43. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 924; see also id. at 921–
22 (referring to federal common law rules of customary international law based on “executive branch”
authorization); Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2260, 2269 (denying a
requirement for “explicit and unambiguous directive”).
44. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 356; see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699
F.3d 763, 777 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e find Congress’s enactment of the TVPA, and the policies it
reflects, to be both instructive and consistent with our view of the common law regarding these aspects
of jus cogens.”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Consistent with that
constitutionally assigned role, Congress sometimes enacts statutes to codify international-law norms
derived from non-self-executing treaties or customary international law, or to fulfill international-law
obligations. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is a good example of that kind of
legislation.”).
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international law] into federal law,”45 and “Congress’s selective
incorporation would be largely superfluous if [customary international
law] were already incorporated wholesale into federal common
law . . . .”46
The revisionist position rejects arguments that customary international
law can generally be regarded as federal common law. The revisionists
cite the exceptional character of federal common law and limited
circumstances in which the Supreme Court has recognized federal
common law rules.47 They also question the extent to which the Nation’s
foreign relations involve matters of uniquely federal interest, noting the
existence of concurrent authority (both federal and state) over many
aspects of “foreign relations.”48 More fundamentally, the revisionists
emphasize that federal authority over foreign relations is vested in the
political branches,49 not in the federal courts, concluding that Erie denies
federal judges the power to make rules of federal law without
authorization by the political branches.50
The revisionists also emphasize the differences between “traditional”
international law (which principally concerns matters of inter-state
relations, such as sovereign immunity and prize law) and “new”
international law (which, in their view, principally concerns human rights
protections, including states’ treatment of their own nationals).51 As a
consequence, revisionists observe, “[customary international law] is now
viewed as regulating many matters that were traditionally regulated by
domestic law,”52 posing even more serious concerns about federal
intrusion into areas of historical state regulatory authority.
Moreover, the revisionists argue that application of customary
international law by federal courts will interfere with the political
branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations. Citing the breadth of
“new” rules of customary international law, the revisionists conclude that
45. Note, An Objection to Sosa—And to the New Federal Common Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2077,
2086 (2006).
46. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 857.
47. Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2272.
48. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 866.
49. The revisionists also contend that, historically, it was the federal political branches, not the
judiciary, that addressed asserted breaches of international law. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights,
supra note 4, at 332 (“During at least the first 150 years of our nation, our constitutional system
permitted states to violate CIL unless and until the federal political branches said otherwise through
enacted federal law.”).
50. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 856–57.
51. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 325–28.
52. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 840–41.
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application of these rules by U.S. courts would have serious foreign
relations consequences.53 They also contend that federal judges lack the
institutional capacity to make judgments about the Nation’s foreign
relations, arguing again against the incorporation of customary
international law by federal courts without clear authorization by the
federal political branches.54
For these reasons, the revisionists conclude that there is generally no
basis for treating customary international law as federal common law.
Instead, as outlined above, Erie requires federal courts to apply state law
(or no law) in the absence of any federal rule of decision: “[u]nder Erie,
if [customary international law] is not federal law, federal courts are not
to apply it unless they determine that it is part of state law.”55 It is therefore
clear, under the revisionists’ analysis, that where state courts have adopted
a rule of customary international law as state law, federal courts will be
obligated to apply that rule, notwithstanding the refusal of federal courts
to recognize a rule of federal law. The revisionists acknowledge this
possibility, but predict that “in most cases, states would rarely incorporate
[customary international law] into state law,” with the result that
“[customary international law] simply would not be a rule of decision in
federal court.”56
C.

The Others: “Customary International Law Can Have an
Intermediate Status Between State and Federal Law”

Other views of customary international law in U.S. courts have also
emerged, provoked by skepticism about both the modernist and revisionist
positions. These alternatives have taken a variety of forms, all of which
are irreconcilable both with one another and with the modernist and
revisionist positions.
Some commentators have suggested resurrecting Swift v. Tyson’s
“general common law,” but limited to international law. This approach
would “treat[] customary international law as ‘general’ law—a third
category of law, neither state nor federal in nature . . . available for both
state and federal courts to apply in appropriate cases . . . .”57 This position

53. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 330, 368–69.
54. Id. at 345–47.
55. Id. at 349.
56. Id. at 349–50.
57. Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 370; see also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 4, at 3
(“[A] new analysis . . . that analogizes customary international law to the law of a foreign sovereign
and applies it accordingly.”).
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assertedly preserves the historic status of customary international law in
U.S. courts while limiting the extent of federal intervention in traditional
areas of state sovereign authority.58
A related approach would treat customary international law as so-called
“non-preemptive federal law,”59 which federal courts could apply, but
only in the absence of contrary state law. These rules of international law
would apply in federal courts (with state courts being free, but not obliged,
to apply them). The rationale for this approach parallels that of the
revisionists, reasoning that Article VI does not include customary
international law among the forms of preemptive federal law and that
Article I, section 8 requires that customary international law be
incorporated by Congress in order to apply in U.S. courts.60
Other commentary has proposed treating customary international law
as so-called “non-preemptive non-federal law,”61 applicable in federal
courts (regardless of conflicting state law), but not in state courts. Under
this analysis, which assertedly involves minimal interference with state
sovereignty, customary international law would only “announce the rule
for the federal branches,” and not the several states.62
Finally, another body of commentary has agreed with the revisionists
that customary international law is not ordinarily federal law, but contends
that some rules of international law do constitute federal law, which
prevails over inconsistent state law and which both state and federal courts
are obligated to apply, even absent political branch authorization.
Specifically, “history and structure demonstrate that courts have applied
certain principles derived from the law of nations as a means of upholding
the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers to Congress and the
President.”63 Under this analysis, federal courts are constitutionally
authorized to apply customary international law rules (and related
doctrines, such as the act of state doctrine)64 that implicate the political

58. Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 502–03.
59. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
555, 558 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, International Law]; see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 346–55 (2007).
60. Ramsey, International Law, supra note 59, at 559–61.
61. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 97 (2004).
62. Id.
63. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
64. See infra section III.B.1; GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 888–963 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing the act of state doctrine).
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branches’ authority over war and recognition of foreign states.65 Apart
from these constitutionally mandated rules, however, customary
international law is a matter of state (or foreign) law unless the federal
political branches have authorized federal courts to apply it.66
II.

THE PROPER STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN U.S. COURTS

One of the first U.S. Supreme Court decisions to consider the
application of customary international law by American courts observed
that “[o]ur situation being new, unavoidably creates new and intricate
questions. We have sovereignties moving within a sovereignty.”67 The
existence of multiple sovereignties—federal and state—as well as
multiple branches of the governments of those sovereignties—
Legislative, Executive and Judicial—continue to give rise to intricate
questions when U.S. courts consider issues of customary international
law. The intricacy of these questions is heightened by the absence of
unequivocal constitutional text or judicial authority resolving them.
None of the existing approaches to the status of customary international
law satisfactorily resolve the questions that the subject raises. As
discussed below, the modernist position ignores critical limitations on the
scope of federal judicial authority, as well as the character of other rules
of international law in the United States. As a result, this position produces
an overbroad approach that is impossible to reconcile with either the
treatment of treaties or the federal courts’ limited authority to make
federal common law. This position is also impossible to reconcile with
existing precedent, which has generally rejected the modernists’
expansive approach to judicial law-making authority, instead requiring a
more nuanced inquiry into the intentions of the political branches and the
content and character of particular rules of international law.
Conversely, the revisionist position ignores federal authority over U.S.
foreign relations and the importance of national uniformity in interpreting
and espousing rules of customary international law. As a result, that
approach also produces an overbroad rule that is impossible to reconcile
with the Constitution’s allocation of authority over the Nation’s foreign
relations. Moreover, the revisionist position is contradicted by judicial
authority: in the post-Erie era, when the issue matters, U.S. courts
consistently treat customary international law as federal law, subject to
65. Bellia & Clark, supra note 63, at 28, 37. The rationale for this approach is that the Framers and
early federal judiciary adopted rules to safeguard the “perfect rights” of foreign states. Id. at 5–6.
66. Id. at 62.
67. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 154 (1795).
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uniform interpretation by the federal courts. Similarly, the revisionists’
insistence on express, or comparably specific, political branch
authorization for judicial application of international law is inconsistent
with both the constitutional authority of those branches and existing
precedent, in which courts have applied international law in a
substantially broader set of circumstances.
Other proposed approaches to the status of customary international law
are also inconsistent with both constitutional text and structure and with
judicial authority. They produce unprecedented forms of U.S. law, such
as non-preemptive federal law, that are consistent with neither broad
federal foreign relations authority nor with limited federal judicial
authority. Not surprisingly, none of these approaches has been adopted by
U.S. courts.
Instead, the better approach adopts elements of both the modernist and
revisionist positions, while rejecting other aspects of those positions.
Under this approach, all rules of customary international law have the
status of federal law, but only those rules of international law which the
federal political branches have empowered U.S. courts to apply will be
judicially applicable. This approach overcomes the deficiencies in both
the modernist and revisionist positions, preserving federal authority over
the Nation’s foreign relations while also respecting limits on unauthorized
law-making by federal courts.
Contrary to the modernist position, this approach ensures that rules of
customary international law, like U.S. treaties, will be directly applicable
in U.S. courts only if the U.S. political branches have so provided.
Contrary to the revisionist position, however, this approach ensures that
all rules of customary international law are rules of federal law, subject to
uniform application and interpretation by federal courts. Moreover, also
contrary to the revisionist position, this approach does not require express,
or comparably specific, congressional authorization to apply customary
international law. Instead, this approach looks to the character and content
of the relevant international law rule, and other circumstances surrounding
the U.S. political branches’ acceptance of that rule, applying factors
paralleling those relevant to determining whether U.S. treaties are selfexecuting.
The approach proposed in this Article is the most sensible
interpretation of the text, structure, and purposes of the Constitution and
the most coherent explanation of existing judicial authority. Although the
views of U.S. courts have varied over time, there is a relatively consistent
theme to judicial applications of international law: U.S. courts have
generally applied customary international law rules only after careful
consideration of the extent to which the federal political branches have, in
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some fashion, provided for such judicial application, exercising particular
care to avoid judicial interference in the Nation’s foreign relations. In
doing so, U.S. courts have in practice eschewed requirements for express
political branch authorization and instead looked to a variety of
considerations, paralleling the considerations that are relevant to
determining whether a U.S. treaty is self-executing. As proposed in this
Article, the same approach should be applicable to rules of customary
international law.
A.

Constitutional Text, Structure, and Purposes

The language, structure, and purposes of the Constitution do not
support, and are instead inconsistent with, both the modern and revisionist
positions. As detailed below, constitutional structure and objectives, as
well as the Constitution’s text, provide decisive support for the view that
all customary international law is federal law, but that particular rules of
customary international law are directly applicable in U.S. courts only
where the federal political branches have provided for such judicial
application.
1.

Federal Foreign Relations Power

The starting point for consideration of the status of customary
international law in U.S. courts is the Constitution’s allocation of
authority over U.S. foreign relations. Those provisions are familiar, and
include the expansive grants of foreign relations authority to the
Legislative and Executive branches in Articles I and II, including the
power to raise armies and declare war;68 to regulate foreign commerce and
immigration;69 to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of
Nations;”70 to appoint and receive ambassadors and make Treaties;71 and
to exercise executive authority as Commander-in-Chief.72 Conversely, the
Constitution also (exceptionally) limits the authority of the states to
undertake international legal obligations, providing in Article I that the
states may not conclude treaties, alliances, compacts, or agreements with
foreign states, grant letters of marque and reprisal, or wage war.73
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 14.
69. Id. cls. 1, 3, 4.
70. Id. cl. 10.
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II § 3, cl. 1.
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation[, or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . . No State shall, without the Consent of
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It is non-controversial that these grants of authority provide the federal
government with broad power over the Nation’s foreign relations, to
ensure that national organs, representing national interests, will have
authority over the Nation’s international affairs. In Madison’s words, “[i]f
we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations.”74 At a minimum, these provisions “reflect[] a concern for
uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations and indicat[e] a
desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of
federal institutions.”75 More expansively, “in respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear,”76 and “[p]ower over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively.”77 Narrower formulations are also plausible, and periodically
invoked,78 but on any view, the Constitution vests the federal government
with uniquely broad and plenary authority over U.S. foreign affairs,
particularly with respect to actions implicating the Nation’s international
legal obligations (whether through “treaties,” “agreements and
compacts,” or the “law of nations”).79
It is against this background of constitutional text and structure that the
revisionists’ claim that customary international law can be, and
presumptively is, non-federal law must be assessed. The Constitution’s
expansive grants of federal authority over the Nation’s foreign relations
make that claim an exceedingly difficult one: the notion that each of the
50 states is presumptively free to adopt and apply its own view as to the
content of rules of customary international law is, at a minimum, in
significant tension with the federal government’s broad affirmative
authority over the Nation’s foreign relations and international legal
obligations, as well as with the Constitution’s limitations on state
authority in these fields.

Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power . . . .”).
74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
75. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
76. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also id. at 330 (“Governmental power
over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.”).
77. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
78. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–24 (2008); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
419–20, 420 n.11 (2003).
79. The importance of federal authority over the Nation’s international legal rights and obligations
is evident from the Constitution’s focus on such issues, particularly in provisions addressing the
power to make treaties and other international agreements, defining rules of customary international
law (the Law of Nations), the power to declare war, and the power to recognize foreign states. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10, 11; U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
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The revisionist position also produces a host of deeply unsatisfactory
results. It means, for example, that individual states would presumptively
be free to adopt divergent views of foreign head-of-state immunity. To
use familiar examples, under the logic of the revisionist position, the
Queen of England or President of China would be subject to different rules
of immunity in Massachusetts, Maine, and Maryland,80 as would U.K. and
Chinese state officials and a number of foreign consuls and diplomats.81
The same result would apply to a wide range of other issues not regulated
by treaties or federal legislation, but subject to universally recognized
rules of customary international law—including attribution of state
responsibility,82 state succession,83 treatment of aliens,84 limits on

80. The United States is not party to any treaty regulating head of state immunity, and no statute
addresses the subject. See Samantar v. Yousef, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (holding that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act does not address head-of-state immunity). Accordingly, the treatment of
foreign heads of state in the United States is subject, on an international plane, to customary
international law. As others have observed, it is implausible to suggest that foreign heads of state
would be entitled to different immunities in different states or to different immunity from that
recognized by the federal Executive branch. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1838; Neuman, supra
note 6, at 382–83.
Some revisionists suggest that there may be grounds for concluding that the federal political
branches have authorized judicial application of customary international law rules of head-of-state
immunity. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 922–23; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 4, at 2160–67. As noted above, however, neither the FSIA nor other
federal legislation, or international agreements, addresses the subject of head-of-state immunity. It is
very difficult to conclude, therefore, that there has been federal political branch authorization of the
character required by revisionist analysis (which, as discussed above, emphasizes the importance of
congressional legislation, or a treaty, under Erie). See supra section I.B; infra section II.A.1; infra
section III.A.
81. The United States is party to treaties regarding diplomatic and consular immunity. Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. However, a
number of states are not party to one (or both) of these treaties, and issues of diplomatic and consular
immunity between these states and the United States are governed by customary international law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 464–66.
82. The United States is not party to any treaty generally prescribing rules for state responsibility.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 207. Issues of state responsibility affecting the United States (and other
states) are subject, on an international plane, to customary international law, generally as reflected in
the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 2002).
83. The United States is not party to any treaty addressing state succession (including the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 208–09. Accordingly, issues of state succession affecting
the United States are subject, on an international plane, to customary international law.
84. The United States is party to a number of treaties regarding the treatment of aliens (including
foreign investors) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 701, cmt. e. However, these treaties address only aspects
of treatment of aliens and involve only some foreign states, leaving most aspects of the subject
governed by customary international law. Id. at §§ 701–02.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction,85 validity of U.S. (and non-U.S.) treaties,86
law of the sea,87 and international environmental issues.88 Other examples
can be readily identified.89
In all of these cases, the logic of the revisionist position necessarily
permits each of the fifty states to adopt different views as to the existence,
contents, and judicial applicability of customary international law rules.
A foreign head of state or other senior foreign official could be immune
from suit (or arrest) in New York, but not New Jersey. A foreign state
could be liable for actions of its agents in California, but not Arizona. A
foreign (or U.S.) investor could be entitled to compensation under one
state’s view of international law, but not another state’s. A treaty could be
effective or applicable in one state, and not in another state.90 In each case,
85. The United States is not party to any treaty generally regulating extraterritorial exercises of
legislative, judicial, or enforcement jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 401–16, 421–23,
431–33. Accordingly, the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by the United States (and other
states) is subject, on an international plane, to customary international law. See id.
86. The United States is not party to any treaty addressing issues regarding the status and legal
effect of treaties, including issues of capacity, consent, reservations, entry into force, provisional
application, pacta sunt servanda, retroactivity, and third-party rights. See generally, RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) pt. III.
87. The United States is not party to any treaty generally regulating the law of the sea (as a
consequence of the United States’s non-ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. V, Intro. Note. However, the Executive branch has declared that
the Convention generally codifies customary international law. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO.
143 CHINA: MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 8 n.14 (2014).
88. Most international environmental law is customary international law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) §§ 601–04.
89. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1850 (“[B]efore the U.S. ratification of the Genocide
Convention, a federal judge, faced with the question whether to apply the rules against genocide in a
civil tort suit, would have to predict whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee, for example, would
incorporate the universal norm against genocide into Tennessee law.”). The revisionists’ observation
that there are generally parallel U.S. constitutional or statutory protections is beside the point. The
relevant inquiry is whether state positions on the international legal status of the rules prescribed by
the Genocide Convention–or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or other
comparable treaties–are binding on the federal courts and override the positions of the federal political
branches (absent legislation or a treaty). The answer to those queries are plainly in the negative.
90. The validity and applicability of a treaty is not governed by the terms of that treaty itself, but
by general principles of customary international law, which determine when particular treaties will
be valid and what they mean. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. III, Intro. Note; THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 552, 557 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (“Legal systems typically need rules to establish
whether the norms prevailing in them are valid or invalid. . . . The only explicit validity rules
circulating in the international legal order are the rules on . . . the invalidity of treaties, as laid down
in Articles 46 to 53 of the [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties].”). It would therefore be
incorrect to suggest that the federal courts’ authority to interpret U.S. treaties as federal law (under
Article VI) would provide federal courts the authority to resolve issues of treaty validity and
applicability as matters of federal law. Those issues are determined, not by the terms of a U.S. treaty,
but by external rules of law (specifically, customary international law). See supra note 86. Moreover,
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individual state courts would be free to announce and apply divergent, and
contradictory, views regarding the content of customary international law
and, therefore, regarding the Nation’s international legal obligations.91
Moreover, in each case, applying the revisionist view that customary
international law is generally a matter of state law, binding on federal
courts absent contrary federal legislation, Erie would also require federal
courts to apply divergent state rules. That is because, as discussed above,
under the revisionist position, both as generally stated and logically
compelled, rules of customary international law are not federal law and,
if adopted by a state, are state law, binding on federal courts under Erie.92
The revisionist position would compel all of the foregoing results, not just
in state courts, but in federal courts as well.
The logic of the revisionist position would generally produce the
foregoing results without regard to contrary Executive branch views,
whether expressed in diplomatic correspondence, statements of policy, or
before international organizations or tribunals. As long as Congress had
not legislated (or the Senate has not ratified a treaty), federal courts would
be forbidden from applying rules of customary international law as federal
law, and would instead be bound to apply state court interpretations of
international law. In the revisionists’ words, “[i]f a state chooses to

there is neither express nor implied statutory (or treaty) authorization for judicial application of these
rules of customary international law. Indeed, with respect to some of these rules, not even the
(unratified) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies the relevant customary international
law rules. Under the logic of the revisionists’ position, state courts would therefore be free to reach
independent conclusions regarding the customary international law rules of treaty validity, which
would also be binding on federal courts under Erie. Indeed, the same conclusion would appear to
apply to the interpretation of treaties to which the Unites States is not party (e.g., the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties) and, at least arguably, the interpretation of U.S. Treaties. Evan
Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L
L. 431, 434 (2004).
91. Indeed, it is difficult to see why the revisionist position would not, in the numerous areas where
there has been no federal political branch authorization for judicial application of customary
international law, permit state legislative enactments from adopting or incorporating asserted rules of
international law, or state officials from participating in forums engaged in the formation of
international law (such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, or the International Law Commission).
92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 870; supra section I.C; infra
notes 97–102 and accompanying text. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith deny that the revisionist
position treats customary international law as state law, instead contending that their position is only
“that [customary international law] should not be a source of law for courts in the United States unless
the appropriate sovereign—the federal political branches or the appropriate state entity—makes it
so.” Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2260. That formulation does not alter the
fundamental premise of the revisionist position, which is that, except in limited cases of federal
political branch authorization for courts to apply customary international law, state courts and
legislatures are free independently to interpret customary international law and to apply divergent and
contradictory rules of international law.
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incorporate [customary international law] into state law, then the federal
courts would be bound to apply the state interpretation of [customary
international law] on issues not otherwise governed by federal law.”93
These results are impossible to reconcile with federal authority over the
Nation’s foreign relations and or with the process by which the United
States (like other countries) conducts its international relations.94 The
revisionist position would prevent the federal political branches’
statements and actions regarding matters of customary international law,
declaring the United States’s formal legal position and engaging the
United States’s international legal responsibility, from being given effect
in U.S. courts. Indeed, as discussed above, the revisionist position would
require federal courts to apply rules of customary international law,
adopted by individual states, that conflicted with the positions of the
federal political branches. This result would place both state and federal
courts, applying state law, in direct conflict with the political branches on
a centrally important aspect of the Nation’s foreign relations—the
interpretation and application of customary international law, governing
the Nation’s conduct and international legal obligations vis-à-vis other
states. That conflict is impossible to reconcile with the broad foreign
affairs powers of the federal political branches.
It is no answer to argue, as the revisionists do, that the federal political
branches could conclude treaties or enact legislation to address particular
issues of customary international law.95 That argument ignores the fact
that, by design and necessity, many aspects of the Nation’s foreign
relations are conducted in other, less formalized ways.96 Requiring the
political branches to conclude treaties or enact legislation to deal with
issues of customary international law would impede those branches’
ability to conduct foreign relations, limiting their flexibility and ignoring
the fluidity inherent in international relations and in making international
law.
The reality is, and inevitably must be, that many of the United States’s
positions regarding customary international law are expressed by informal
communications or other actions of the political branches (such as

93. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 870; see supra section I.C; infra
notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
94. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1832 (“specter that multiple variants of the same international
law rule could proliferate among the several states”); Neuman, supra note 6, at 376–77.
95. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 819–20.
96. See Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku & Daniel Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: The
Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems, 57 INT’L ORG. 43 (2003); Charles Lipson, Why Are
Some International Agreements Informal, 45 INT’L ORG. 495 (1991).
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diplomatic notes or protests, submissions in international legal
proceedings, and statements in international forums),97 which over time
come to express the United States’s legal position and, in many cases, the
content of customary international law.98 The revisionists’ rule would
permit state courts (or legislation) to contradict the positions of the
political branches, expressed in these ways—a result again impossible to
reconcile with the broad foreign affairs powers of the federal political
branches.
The revisionist position is therefore in direct conflict with the need for
the United States to speak with “one voice” on matters of international
law. Although broader applications of the principle may be unjustified, a
critical element of the political branches’ foreign relations power is the
federal government’s ability to “speak for the Nation with one voice in
dealing with other governments,”99 particularly regarding the content of
international law and the United States’s international legal obligations.100
This ensures that the interests of the Nation as a whole, in its international
relations, will not be undermined or compromised by divergent or
parochial positions of individual states.101
Divergent state court (or legislative) interpretations of international law
would compromise the federal political branches’ ability to speak with
one voice on behalf of the Nation. In particular, state pronouncements on
the content of rules of customary international law would undermine the
credibility and weight of contrary federal positions on those same issues.
97. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed.
2012); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 17 (2d rev. ed. 2012).
98. The process of the formation of rules of customary international law has been addressed
extensively elsewhere. See K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 59–62 (2d ed.
1993); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1975);
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General
Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988–1989).
99. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (“At some point an exercise of state power that touches on
foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity
in this country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the
foreign relations power to the National Government in the first place.” (citing Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964))); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434, 449 (1979); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (“[T]he Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.”).
100. See supra section II.A.1.
101. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
424 (“[I]t is plain that the problems involved [in the area of foreign relations] are uniquely federal in
nature.”).
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For example, declarations by the U.S. political branches that a particular
rule had (or had not) achieved the status of customary international law
would be undermined by state court decisions reaching the opposite
conclusion, while political branch declarations denying (or asserting) the
existence of opinio juris could be denied international effect by state court
decisions reaching the opposite conclusion.102 As an amicus curiaae brief
for the United States in a state court proceeding reasoned, arguing that
customary international law was federal law:
It is especially in areas not governed by precise treaty stipulations
that “divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations” can
most markedly affect the conduct of international relations. Were
individual states free to formulate their own rules in such areas,
the capacity of the United States to contribute with authority to
the development of the international legal order would be greatly
diminished . . . . The federal government cannot effectively
invoke standards of international law to ensure continued
favorable treatment by foreign governments for American
governmental property abroad if these standards are not given
effect by the political subdivisions of the United States.103
The foregoing conclusions have particular force given the process by
which customary international law is (and must be) formed, an issue that
the revisionists largely ignore. As noted above, that process entails the
evaluation of state practice with the objective of identifying “a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”104
Importantly, one means of establishing the existence (or non-existence)
of a rule of customary international law is “judgments and opinions of
national judicial tribunals.”105 The actions of individual states and the
decisions of state courts are attributable to and binding on the United
States as a matter of international law.106

102. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424 (“If . . . state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the
purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal
pronouncement on the subject.”).
103. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 39–40, Republic of Argentina v.
City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252 (1969).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(2).
105. Id. § 103(2)(b); id. cmt. b.
106. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876) (“Upon whom would such a claim be
made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations
with other nations. It would be made upon the government of the United States.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 207 reporters’ note 3 (“The United States has consistently accepted international
responsibility for actions or omissions of its constituent States and has insisted upon similar
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As a consequence, state court decisions adopting particular views of
customary international law do not merely involve the risk of committing
violations of international law or undermining U.S. government positions,
but also entail the individual states’ direct participation in the formation
of rules of international law, binding the entire Nation.107 This
participation would include contributing to formation of a rule of
international law108 on which the federal government has not yet taken a
position or may oppose. Once that rule is established, the United States
might well be bound as a matter of international law, regardless of
subsequent contrary views of the federal government.109 Alternatively,
state court decisions could undercut the formation of a rule of
international law that the federal government supported, by denying the
rule’s existence. In all of these cases, categorizing customary international
law as state law produces unacceptable results with the potential seriously
to undermine the federal political branches’ role in creating and applying
international law.
To take another familiar example,110 Oregon or California courts could
hold that customary international law forbids capital punishment, or
provides a claim in tort to recover damages for certain types of
environmental pollution, or guarantees asylum to certain aliens; at the
same time, South Carolina courts would be free to hold the opposite,
rejecting arguments that international law forbids capital punishment or
allows claims for environmental pollution or asylum. Both sets of
holdings would, under the logic of the revisionist position, be matters of
state law, with no possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review. In these
circumstances, both sets of state court holdings could materially affect the
responsibility on the part of the national governments of other federal states.”).
107. See PITT COBBETT, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 103–05 (Hugh Bellot ed., 4th ed. 1921) (citing
Massachusetts decision to establish content of customary international law); Michael Wood (Special
Rapporteur), Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (“[A]ccount has to be taken of all available practice of a particular
State. . . . This may be particularly likely with the practice of sub-State organs (for example, in a
federal State).”); id. ¶¶ 34, 37; Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 62, ¶ 62 (April 29) (“According to a well-established
rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State.”).
108. See K. WOLFKE, supra note 98, at 73 (“[I]t is a truism to say that a judicial organ ascertaining
customs to some extent creates them.”).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102(4), 207 reporters’ note 3; ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1971) (custom “is generally regarded as having
universal application, whether or not any given state participated in its formation or later ‘consented’
to it”).
110. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 349–51; Brilmayer, supra note 3,
at 322–29; Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 382–84, 474–79.

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1666

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

international legal position of the United States, potentially binding the
Nation to whichever state court first expressed its position, while also
having more general effects on the weight and credibility of contrary
federal positions.111 All of this would seriously undermine the conduct of
U.S. foreign relations and the United States’s participation in the
development of international law.
The revisionist position is also very difficult to reconcile with Article
I’s express (and exceptional) denial of state authority to conclude treaties,
compacts, or agreements with foreign states.112 Although Article I, section
8 does not refer expressly to customary international law, all of the state
actions that it does refer to are closely analogous to direct state
participation in the making of customary international law through state
judicial decisions on issues of international law. Each type of state action
referred to in Article I involves the formation of international legal
obligations, on the basis of state consent,113 and result in the responsibility
of the entire United States.114 Given this, and the lack of clear textual
direction or evidence of intent in Article I, section 8,115 it is very difficult
to see why constitutional prohibitions against the making of international
agreements by states do not apply with equal force to state interpretations
and applications of customary international law.116
111. See Wood, supra note 107, ¶ 50 (“[I]t may be necessary to look cautiously at that practice . . .
[w]here a State speaks in several voices, its practice is ambivalent, and such conflict may well weaken
the weight to be given to the practice concerned.”); id. ¶ 79.
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
113. See supra section II.A.1.
114. See supra section II.A.1.
115. It is unclear what precise meaning the Framers attributed to the terms “treaty,” “agreement,”
and “compact.” See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 463 (1978) (“Whatever
distinct meanings the Framers attributed to the terms in Art. I, § 10, those meanings were soon lost.”);
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893); Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the
Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by “Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453,
457 (1936). As a consequence, the Supreme Court has looked to the purposes and consequences of
particular arrangements in applying Article I. See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 463. From that
perspective, the same concerns that underlie the conclusion of international “agreements” by states
also apply to the states’ participation in the formation of customary international law. See also JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 668 (Ronald D. Rotunda
and John E. Nowak, eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (by virtue of Article I’s prohibitions
against actions by states, “[u]niformity is thus secured in all operations which relate to foreign powers;
and an immediate responsibility to the nation on the part of those for whose conduct the nation is
itself responsible”).
116. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000) (state law
restricting purchases of goods from companies conducting business in Burma intrudes on federal
foreign affairs authority); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432–36 (1968) (state inheritance statute
intrudes on federal foreign affairs authority); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1886)
(state’s extradition to foreign nation intrudes on federal foreign affairs authority).The revisionists
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It was for these reasons that, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
the Supreme Court endorsed Judge Jessup’s “caution[] that rules of
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial
state interpretations,” and declared that this “basic rationale is equally
applicable to the act of state doctrine.”117 The Court’s language could not
have been more clear in characterizing customary international law as
federal law. It is, of course, true that the Court went on to refuse to directly
apply customary international law rules against uncompensated
expropriations in Sabbatino.118 But that refusal has nothing to do with the
Court’s prior observation that rules of international law could not be
governed by “divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations,”119 or
the Court’s explicit approval of Judge Jessup’s categorization of
customary international law as federal law. Rather, that refusal concerns
only the separate issue, discussed below, of the existence of political
branch authorization for direct judicial application of particular rules of
customary international law by U.S. courts.120
As discussed above, the foregoing conclusions have particular force
because the actions of individual states are, as a matter of international
law, attributable to and binding upon the United States.121 Where the
United States as a whole is responsible for, and bound by, the actions of
individual states applying customary international law, it is implausible to
conclude that the states are free to adopt divergent, conflicting
interpretations of international law (with those views being binding on the
federal courts). Rather, as Sabbatino concluded, the United States’s
ultimate responsibility for interpretations of customary international law
necessarily requires federal judicial authority over such interpretations.122
observe, correctly, that Article I, section 8, omits reference to customary international law (or the law
of nations), although other provisions of the Constitution contain such references, and conclude that
state participation in the making of customary international law is therefore not prohibited. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 862–63. That analysis fails to account for
Article I, section 8’s notorious lack of clarity or the purposes of section 8’s prohibition against
independent state action. See supra note 115.
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (emphasis added). Justice
White’s dissenting opinion agreed that rules of customary international law were federal law. Id. at
451 (White, J., dissenting).
118. See infra section II.B.1.
119. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.
120. See infra section II.A.1; infra section II.A.2.
121. See supra section II.A.1.
122. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937) (“[N]o part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring [international complaints] on the
whole.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he
peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The union will undoubtedly be

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1668

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

Importantly, federal law governs both the content of rules of customary
international law and the question whether such rules of international law
are directly applicable in U.S. courts. It is essential to the federal foreign
affairs power that federal courts, applying uniform federal law, determine
whether a particular rule of customary international law exists, what its
content is, and whether U.S. courts have been authorized by the federal
political branches to apply that rule. With respect to this final question,
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sabbatino, articulating a rule governing
whether international law rules regarding expropriation were applicable
in U.S. courts, is directly relevant: “an issue concerned with a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law.”123
The foregoing conclusions are confirmed by U.S. courts’ treatment of
international law in other contexts. For example, it is clear that, under the
Charming Betsy presumption (requiring interpretation of federal
legislation consistently with international law),124 the relevant rules of
international law are ascertained as a matter of federal law: the effects of
the Charming Betsy presumption on the meaning of federal legislation do
not vary from state to state, as they necessarily would if international law
were generally a matter of state law.125 The same is true of the
presumption against extraterritoriality, based in substantial part on rules
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasizing “the advantage of uniformity in all points
which relate to foreign powers”).
123. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. As discussed below, this is precisely how U.S. treaties are treated:
the question whether a treaty’s provisions are self-executing is a question of federal (not state) law.
See infra section II.A.2.
124. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 114; see also Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon, supra note
4, at 482.
125. Some revisionists argue that the Charming Betsy presumption is a rule of federal common law
and that this implies incorporation of uniform federal rules of customary international law. See
Bradley, Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 4, at 534; Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing
Relevance, supra note 4, at 921. That explanation is unpersuasive: the fact that the Charming Betsy
presumption is a rule of federal law does not mean that the rules of international law incorporated by
the Charming Betsy canon are also federal law. Federal law looks routinely to state law in similar
circumstances. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (under section 1983, “in several
respects . . . federal law looks to the law of the State in which the cause of action arose”); Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (“[C]ourts should incorporate state law when
fashioning federal common law rules.”). If, as the revisionists contend, customary international law
does not have the status of federal common law, then it is very difficult to see how the Charming
Betsy presumption would incorporate such (non-existent) rules of federal law.
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of customary international law;126 again, the presumption is applicable
uniformly in all American courts to determine the scope of federal
legislation, regardless of state court views about the precise scope of
jurisdictional limitations imposed by international law. In each case, it is
both settled and obvious that the rules of international law applicable in
U.S. courts are uniform rules of federal, not state, law.
Some revisionist analyses suggest that judicial application of a few
rules of customary international law may be regarded as having been
authorized by independent Executive branch action, including rules
regarding treaty interpretation127 and foreign sovereign immunity.128
These suggestions have generally been guarded,129 and are contrary to
prior revisionist positions (which required legislation or treaty provisions
expressly incorporating international law).130 These suggestions are also
difficult to reconcile with the centerpiece of revisionist analysis —that,
after Erie, customary international law cannot be “a source of law for
courts in the United States unless the appropriate sovereign — the federal
political branches or the appropriate state entity — makes it so.”131
126. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (“This
rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law . . . .”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he practice of using international
law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence.”); Gary
Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 8–9
(1992).
127. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 921–22. These
analyses have suggested that the (unratified) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could provide
“gap-filling” rules for interpretation of treaties, which might be applied as federal common law,
apparently relying on Executive branch authorization. Id. As discussed below, this position is very
difficult to reconcile with earlier revisionist positions or with the revisionists’ emphasis on legislative
law-making authority under Erie. See supra section I.A; infra section II.A.2; infra section III.A.
128. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Continuing Relevance, supra note 4, at 922–23. These
analyses have suggested that Executive branch suggestions of immunity prior to enactment of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provided a basis for judicial development of rules of federal
common law. Again, these suggestions are difficult to reconcile with the logic of the revisionist
position.
129. See id. at 922 (“Sometimes, courts look to principles of CIL as embodied in the Vienna
Convention . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 924 (“[C]ourts are looking, at least to some degree, for
political branch authorization.”) (emphasis added); Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note
4, at 2269–70 (“The head-of-state immunity example illustrates that in some cases there will be
plausible arguments for and against the requisite political branch authorization . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
130. See supra section I.B; supra note 41.
131. Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2260; see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
Human Rights, supra note 4, at 345 (“[J]udicial federalization of CIL without political branch
authorization is inconsistent with American constitutional democracy,” in part, because it applies a
“law against states by federal courts without the filter of constitutional or legislative authorization.”);
Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 857 (treating customary international law
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Moreover, the logic of these suggestions would open the door to much
broader incorporation of customary international law as federal law, based
entirely on Executive branch action, than that promised by revisionist
analysis more generally.132
Most fundamentally, however, even accepting these suggestions, the
revisionist position would continue to treat very substantial portions of the
corpus of customary international law as non-federal law. That is obvious
from the Constitution’s limits on Executive branch authority,133 and is
explicit in revisionist analysis: “[t]he term ‘customary international law’
subsumes a variety of different norms, only some of which the political
branches want to federalize.”134 Thus, under the revisionist analysis, states
remain free to adopt divergent positions with respect to both the content
of the customary international law rules in these fields, whatever they may
be, and the applicability of such rules in U.S. courts. As discussed above,
and assuming no political branch authorization, Oregon and South
Carolina courts would remain free to reach different conclusions
regarding the content and applicability of customary international law in
U.S. courts, including on issues such as capital punishment,
environmental torts, and asylum. These results are impossible to reconcile
with federal authority over U.S. foreign affairs and the necessity that the
Nation speak with one voice about the content of customary international
law and U.S. international legal obligations.135
as federal common law is “in tension with basic notions of American representative democracy”
because “it is not applying law generated by the U.S. lawmaking processes,” but rather “law derived
from the views and practices of the international community”).
132. Relatedly, the specific examples of Executive branch authorization suggested by some
revisionist analysis are difficult to characterize as involving any meaningful acts of political branch
authorization for U.S. courts to apply such rules. Thus, there is no indication of any such actions with
regard to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which, instead, the Senate has refused to
ratify). See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1839–40. Similarly, judicial application of rules of
foreign sovereign, consular, diplomatic, head-of-state and official immunity routinely occurred in the
absence of Executive branch suggestions of immunity (much less legislative authorization); although
Executive suggestions of immunity were sometimes treated as conclusive by U.S. courts, the decisive
point is that, even in the absence of such Executive branch suggestions, courts directly applied
customary international law. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945)
(“[C]ourts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites of [foreign sovereign] immunity
exist.”); Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 770–77 (4th Cir. 2012) (head-of-state and official act
immunity). Thus, in neither of these categories is there meaningful evidence of actions by the federal
political branches to authorize judicial application of customary international law rules.
133. See infra section II.A.2.
134. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2270.
135. Ironically, many statements of the modern position produce the same (unacceptable) results.
Most modernists would not treat all customary international law rules as federal common law, instead
requiring some sort of heightened showing of specificity. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1835
(“Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate them
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It is no answer to object to “unelected federal judges apply[ing]
customary [international] law made by the world community at the
expense of state prerogatives . . . [where] the interests of the states are
neither formally nor effectively represented in the lawmaking process.”136
The relevant question is whose interests and lawmaking processes must
prevail in the formation and judicial application of customary
international law—those of individual states and their citizens or the
United States and its citizens. The answer is straightforward: federal
judges, selected by the federal government,137 applying uniform federal
law, ultimately reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, plainly must
prevail on issues of customary international law, binding the Nation and
directly impacting its foreign relations.138 And when the President and
Congress participate in the selection of federal judges and in the formation
of customary international law, then the interests of the states—all of the
states—have been both “formally [and] effectively represented in the
lawmaking process” of customary international law.139
It is also no answer to object that “[customary international law] was
not viewed as federal law during most of our nation’s history.”140 It is noncontroversial141 that, prior to the “avulsive” changes produced by Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, customary international law was “general common
law”—which was neither state nor federal in character.142 As the
revisionists usually acknowledge,143 pre-Erie authority is therefore of
limited value in determining the status of customary international law in

into federal common law.”) (emphasis added); Neuman, supra note 6, at 387–88 (requiring a “genuine
norm of customary international law,” not “emerging norms”). As a consequence, “insufficiently
crystallized” rules or “emerging norms” of international law would be state law under the modernist
analysis—leading to the same ills as those produced by the revisionist position. See supra section
II.A.1.
136. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 868.
137. There is little question that with regard to their selection, experience, and institutional
structure, federal courts are better situated to decide issues of international law than state courts. Koh,
State Law?, supra note 6, at 1849 (“[F]ederal judges have structural attributes that make them more
appropriate adjudicators to rule on international matters.”).
138. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (quoted infra, note 212); Koh, State
Law?, supra note 6, at 1853 n.163 (“Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal would also allow unelected
federal and state judges to construe customary international law, but as some species of state law.”).
139. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 868.
140. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 332.
141. Contrary suggestions are plainly untenable. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and
Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 308–09 (1999).
142. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 824; Young, Sorting Out, supra
note 19, at 374–75.
143. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 849.
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a post-Erie legal system. The more relevant inquiry is what the text,
structure, and purposes of the Constitution require, and as discussed
above, those sources require treating customary international law as
federal law.
In any event, prior to Erie, customary international law was regarded
as general common law, not as state law. Simply re-characterizing
customary international law as state law because it was not previously
federal law is a non sequitur. Erie raises, but does not resolve, the question
of how rules of general common law should be categorized—as state law
or federal law—in a system which requires a choice. The answer to that
question is, again, provided by the federal foreign relations powers,
requiring that international law be treated as federal, not state, law.144 That
answer is confirmed by post-Erie judicial authority, discussed below,
holding consistently that rules of international law, and their status in the
U.S. courts, are matters of federal law.145
Finally, suggestions that customary international law should be
regarded as “non-preemptive federal law,” “non-preemptive non-federal
law,” or “general common law”146 are also untenable. All of these
alternatives are even less consistent with expansive federal foreign
relations authority than the revisionist position. Indeed, these alternatives
make it even more difficult for the United States to speak with one
voice,147 while simultaneously creating novel categories of law that
resurrect the risks of different results in state and federal courts that Erie
sought to prevent. These results are incompatible with both the federal
foreign affairs power and the Article VI Supremacy Clause, and are even
less plausible than the revisionist position.148

144. That answer is supported by the fact that, in pre-Erie America, the general common law had
an important unifying function: “[t]he ‘general common law’ had provided a coordinating concept
that linked [the federal and state judicial] systems in a joint interpretive enterprise.” Neuman, supra
note 6, at 378; see infra section II.B.2; infra note 333.
145. See infra section II.B.1; infra section II.B.2.
146. See Aleinikoff, supra note 61, at 97; Ramsey, International Law, supra note 59, at 558;
Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 502–03.
147. They do so by adding an additional voice (federal courts) to the fifty (state court) voices under
the revisionist position.
148. Other commentators have argued that the Constitution itself authorizes federal courts to make
federal common law in order to safeguard the federal political branches’ foreign relations authority.
Bellia & Clark, supra note 63, at 7. In order to cabin this position, however, its proponents postulate
that the Framers and U.S. courts sought only to safeguard the “perfect rights” of foreign states, as a
means of avoiding interference with the powers to declare war and recognize foreign states. The
absence of any evidence of attention by nineteenth century U.S. courts to the concept of “perfect
rights,” coupled with the breadth and uncertainty of the concept, present insurmountable obstacles for
this thesis. It does, however, usefully emphasize the breadth of the political branches’ foreign relations
authority.

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]
2.

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS

1673

Separation of Powers

The characterization of all rules of customary international law as
federal law does not conclude inquiry into the status of these rules in U.S.
courts. Rather, it is also necessary separately to consider whether, on the
one hand, the federal political branches have provided for U.S. courts to
apply particular rules of customary international law or, whether, on the
other hand, the U.S. political branches intended, in accepting such a rule,
that it operate only internationally, requiring subsequent domestic
implementation in the United States by Congress (or otherwise) before it
could be judicially applicable by U.S. courts. This analysis gives effect to
Erie’s prohibition against unauthorized judicial law-making and parallels
the approach applicable to other international legal obligations to which
the U.S. political branches subject the United States by way of treaties or
other international agreements; as discussed below, the approach
applicable to U.S. treaties applies with equal force to customary
international law.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that U.S. treaties are federal
law, the “supreme Law of the Land,” which prevails over inconsistent
state law.149 Nonetheless, despite that text and the status of treaties as
federal law, it has been clear from the early days of the Republic that
particular provisions of U.S. treaties will only be directly applicable in
U.S. courts if they are “self-executing.”150 More specifically, a treaty
provision will be given effect in U.S. courts if the political branches—in
particular, the President and Senate—intended that the provision
“operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”151 On the
other hand, if the political branches intend the treaty provision to “import
a contract,” then the provision “addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before
it can become a rule for the Court.”152
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties
was articulated in the first U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning U.S.

149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
150. The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was recognized from
the earliest days of the Republic. Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 403–04 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1788).
151. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829).
152. Id. at 314.
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treaties. In Ware v. Hylton,153 the Court considered whether a provision of
the Treaty of Paris applied directly in a U.S. judicial proceeding to
invalidate a state law that nullified debts to British subjects. Justice Chase
reasoned that, notwithstanding the text of Article VI, “[n]o one can doubt
that a treaty may stipulate, that certain acts shall be done by the
Legislature; that other acts shall be done by the Executive; and others by
the Judiciary.”154 The Court continued:
When . . . a treaty stipulates for any thing of a legislative nature,
the manner of giving effect to this stipulation is by that power
which possesses the Legislative authority, and which
consequently is authorized to prescribe laws to the people for their
obedience, passing such laws as the public obligation requires.155
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the relevant treaty provision was
addressed to the courts, not to Congress, and that the provision therefore
applied directly to preempt otherwise applicable state law.156
The Court adopted the same distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties in Foster v. Neilson.157 Citing Article VI, the
Court observed that the “constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the
land,”158 and therefore federal law, directly applicable in U.S. courts. But
Chief Justice Marshall also qualified that observation, holding that a treaty
is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision.”159 And the Court went on, following the analysis in Ware v.
Hylton, to hold that, “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.”160
This distinction between self-executing treaties, addressed to the
judiciary, and non-self-executing treaties, addressed to the political

153. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
154. Id. at 244.
155. Id. at 272.
156. Id. at 244–45.
157. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
158. Id. at 254.
159. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
160. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that the treaty “seems to be the language of contract;
and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature.
Until such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject.”
Id. (emphasis added).
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branches, was applied throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries,161 and adopted without controversy in the Restatements of
Foreign Relations Law.162 According to the Third Restatement, “a ‘nonself-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence
of necessary implementation.”163 Or, as the Supreme Court recently
summarized, “[t]his Court has long recognized the distinction between
treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that—
while they constitute international law commitments—do not by
themselves function as binding federal law.”164
As the text of the Third Restatement suggests, the distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing provisions applies equally to
treaties and other international agreements concluded by the United

161. See, e.g., The Five Percent Discount Cases, 243 U.S. 97, 105 (1917) (applying the distinction);
De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267–68, 273 (1890) (applying the distinction); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“If the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing,
that is, require no legislation to make them operative . . . they [will] have the force and effect of a
legislative enactment.”); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410–11, 429–30 (1886) (applying
the distinction); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884) (“A treaty, then, is a law of
the land as an act of [C]ongress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the
private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in
a court of justice, [courts must] resor[t] to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it
would to a statute.”); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (applying
the distinction).
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 111(3), (4); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES § 106 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft, 2015) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH)].
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3).
164. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008). Even if a treaty is non-self-executing, it
nonetheless constitutes federal law under the Supremacy Clause. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 203–04 (2d ed. 1996); Curtis A. Bradley, SelfExecution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 174 [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Duality].
Some recent commentary argues that the Framers did not intend to allow non-self-executing treaties.
See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764 (1988); Carlos Manual
Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113–14
(1992). That view is inconsistent with long-established judicial authority and practice, fundamental
to the contemporary conduct of U.S. foreign relations, see supra section II.A.2, and is logically
untenable: consider a treaty provision obligating each contracting state to “enact legislation providing
for the protection of intellectual property rights” or to “adopt regulations for the free movement of
persons between the contracting states.” Provisions of this character are inevitably non-self-executing.
See Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 403 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1788) (interpreting Treaty of
Peace with Britain providing “Congress shall recommend it to the Several Legislatures to provide for
such a restitution; and, as to those of another description, they have liberty given them by the treaty . . .
and Congress is to recommend to the States, that they be restored on refunding the money paid for
[the estates]”).
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States.165 It is, of course, well-settled that the federal political branches
possess the constitutional authority to conclude international agreements
in forms other than treaties.166 Thus, provisions of both congressionalexecutive agreements167 and sole executive agreements168 have repeatedly
been held directly applicable in U.S. courts, and given effect
notwithstanding contrary provisions of state law. Most recently, in
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,169 the Supreme Court
commented that sole executive agreements are generally “fit to pre-empt
state law, just as treaties are,” and held that a specific sole executive
agreement was directly applicable in U.S. courts, superseding rights that
would otherwise exist under U.S. state law.170
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3).
166. See id. § 303. Again, some recent commentary argues that the Framers did not intend to permit
sole executive or congressional-executive agreements. See RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT,
supra note 59, at 174–75, 186–93 (2007) (describing various kinds of “non-treaty agreements”);
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1581–90 (2007)
[hereinafter Clark, Sole Executive Agreements]; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1221 (1995). That view is again inconsistent with 200 years of practice and nearly a century of judicial
authority. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“While th[e] rule in respect of
treaties is established by the express language of clause 2, article 6, of the Constitution, the same rule
would result in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete
power over international affairs is in the national government.”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 496 n.163 (“Presidents from Washington
to Clinton have made many thousands of agreements . . . on matters running the gamut of U.S. foreign
relations.”); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1995).
167. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) (approving congressional-executive
agreement). Cf. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) (upholding validity of international
agreement approved by Senate super-majority, not denominated as a treaty); Gross v. German Found.
Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d 605, 611–13 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering whether Joint Statement of Berlin
Accords, which “is not a formal treaty,” is self-executing).
168. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 230 (1942) (“‘[A]ll international compacts and
agreements’ are to be treated with similar dignity [to treaties under Article VI’s Supremacy Clause]
for the reason that ‘complete power over international affairs is in the national government. . . . A
treaty is a ‘Law of the Land’ under the supremacy clause . . . . Such international compacts and
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity.”); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (“[W]hile
this rule [i.e., supremacy over prior law] in respect of treaties is established by the express language
of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts
and agreements.”); Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870) (“Such conventions are not
treaties within the meaning of the constitution, and, as treaties, supreme law of the land, conclusive
on the courts, but they are provisional arrangements . . . [which are] for the occasion an expression of
the will of the people through their political organ, touching the matters affected; and to avoid
unhappy collision between the political and judicial branches . . . such an expression to a reasonable
limit should be followed by the courts and not opposed, though extending to the temporary restraint
or modification of the operation of an existing statute.”).
169. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
170. Id. at 416, 419–20, 419 n.11; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United
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U.S. courts have looked to a variety of factors to determine whether
particular treaties or other international agreements171 were intended by
the U.S. political branches to be self-executing.172 These factors include
statements in the agreement indicating its status,173 the character of the
agreement and content of the rights it conferred,174 statements in the U.S.
negotiating or ratification process,175 the character and content of related
international agreements,176 and the post-ratification views and conduct of
the United States.177 These factors have produced a variety of results, with
some agreements and some provisions of agreements treated as selfexecuting, and others as non-self-executing.178
The approach that applies to treaties (and congressional-executive and
sole executive agreements) under Article VI should also apply to
customary international law. There is, of course, no express textual basis
for such a result (because Article VI refers only to “Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” and
“Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States,” and not to customary international law).179 But that has not
prevented congressional-executive and sole executive agreements, which
are also absent from Article VI’s text, from being treated in the same
States v. Kelly, 676 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he purposes of the treaty and the objectives of
its creators . . . . is the factor that is critical to determine whether an executive agreement is self
executing . . . .” (emphasis added, omissions in original)); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 35 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“a congressional-executive agreement, the language of
which made the agreement self-executing” is “domestic U.S. law”).
171. Some provisions of a treaty may be self-executing even if others are not. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 111 cmt. h.
172. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–18 (2008); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373
(7th Cir. 1985) (“[C]ourts consider several factors in discerning the intent of the parties to the
agreement: (1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances
surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting
a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5; Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 164, at 149.
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(4)(a); see Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–05.
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5 (“[p]rovisions in treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation . . . conferring rights on foreign nationals”); see also RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ note 2 (“Courts also have been more likely to find self-execution when
treaty provisions address matters of individual or private rights as opposed to the rights of the state.”).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(4)(b); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 reporters’
note 2.
176. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517–18 (2008).
177. See id. at 506–07.
178. See Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 600–30 (2007) (categorizing Supreme
Court decisions regarding self-executing status of treaties).
179. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1678

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

manner as treaties for purposes of Article VI.180 The same conclusions
apply to rules of customary international law to which the U.S. political
branches have subjected the United States; that is true notwithstanding the
status of all customary international law rules as federal law.181 The basis
for the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties—that the political branches may not intend to make international
obligations that they have undertaken applicable directly in U.S. courts,
notwithstanding their status as federal law—is at least equally applicable
to customary international law rules. Like some treaty obligations, many
rules of customary international law are plainly not intended for direct
application in national courts. International law rules regarding the use of
force and protection of the environment are obvious examples.182 It would
make no sense to conclude that the U.S. political branches intended these
rules to be automatically applicable in U.S. courts.
Indeed, if a formal written treaty, negotiated by the President and
approved by the Senate, must be examined in order to determine whether
the political branches intended it to be self-executing, it is impossible to
see why customary international law, not involving any equivalent written
instrument, individualized negotiations, or Senate approval, should not be
subject to the same inquiry. Moreover, in practice, customary
international law rules are also characterized by substantially less clarity
and precision than treaty provisions,183 again, arguing for care in treating
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 303; supra section II.A.2.
181. The Third Restatement devotes no attention to the question whether customary international
law is directly applicable in U.S. courts. It provides, in section 111(3), that U.S. courts “are bound to
give effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States,” except for “nonself-executing” agreements. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3). No similar exception is included in
section 111 for “non-self-executing” rules of customary international law. Comment d recites that
rules of customary international law “while not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, are
also federal law and as such are supreme over State law.” Id. cmt. d. Comment h then addresses “selfexecuting and non-self-executing international agreements” without reference to customary
international law. Id. cmt. h. The Restatement makes no effort to explain the differential treatment of
customary and conventional international law.
182. See CRAWFORD, supra note 97, at 69 (“A rule . . . of a strictly interstate character . . . may be
difficult to restructure as a norm within a domestic legal system, aside from cases where the common
law has transposed the various state immunities directly from international law.”).
183. As Justice Cardozo put it, “[i]nternational law . . . has at times, like the common law within
states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice.” New
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934). See D’AMATO, supra note 109, at 4 (“The questions
of how custom comes into being and how it can be change or modified are wrapped in mystery and
illogic.”); G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1983) (“The
views represented in doctrine provide a kaleidoscopic picture ranging from one extreme to the
other.”); WOLFKE, supra note 98, at 4–5.
Some customary international law principles are particularly ill-suited for judicial application. See
Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, ¶
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such rules as directly applicable in U.S. courts. Given these
considerations, an inquiry into the self-executing status of customary
international law rules is more, not less, appropriate than it is for treaties
and other international agreements.
Despite this, the modern position is that all rules of customary
international law are presumptively self-executing and applicable in U.S.
courts. That is the rule prescribed by the Third Restatement,184 as well as
by proponents of the modern position: “[i]nternational law . . . is ‘selfexecuting’ and is applied by courts in the United States without any need
for it to be enacted or implemented by Congress.”185 As already discussed,
however, this position is impossible to reconcile with the treatment of
other forms of international law in the United States or with the character
of customary international law; rather, like treaties, particular rules of
customary international law must be examined to determine whether they
are self-executing and directly applicable in U.S. courts.
Federal judicial application of customary international law rules,
without political branch direction, is also inconsistent with constitutional
text and structure. Article I contains the Constitution’s most relevant
reference to customary international law, granting Congress the power to
“define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations.”186
Likewise, Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising
under “Laws” and “Treaties” of the United States, but not customary
international law,187 and Article VI provides that “Laws” and “Treaties”
of the United States, but not customary international law, are the supreme
Law of the Land.188
These provisions do not support, and are instead in tension with, the
modernist claim that federal courts are presumptively empowered to apply
111 (Oct. 12) (“A body of detailed rules is not to be looked for in customary international law which
in fact comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation of the
members of the international community, together with a set of customary rules whose presence in
the opinio juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive
and convincing practice . . . .”). The need for inquiry into political branch authorization of judicial
application is particularly appropriate in these circumstances.
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 111(1), (3).
185. Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 20, at 1561; see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
International Law, supra note 4, at 858 (“[P]roponents of the modern position contend that all of CIL,
unlike treaties, is ‘self-executing’ federal law.”).
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
187. On the contrary, although early drafts of Article III included reference to the Law of Nations
as federal law, the Framers eventually omitted the reference. See William S. Dodge, The
Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L
L. 687, 705–11 (2002).
188. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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all rules of customary international law as preemptive federal law, without
the need for any federal political branch direction. Instead, these
provisions suggest decisively that it was the federal political branches that
were granted authority to define rules of customary international law and
incorporate them into U.S. federal law. Neither Article I, section 8 nor
Articles III and VI provide for an independent federal judicial role in
making rules of customary international law, as envisaged by the
modernists.
On the contrary, the modernist position is difficult to reconcile with
constitutional limits on the law-making powers of the federal courts. The
central lesson of Erie is that federal courts have limited independent
authority to make rules of law. When Justice Brandeis declared that,
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state,”189 he
made clear that the federal courts lacked independent authority to make
rules of general common law, even in fields where federal legislative and
executive authority was unquestioned. Thus, “[Erie] recognizes that
federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the
scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, the Court must point to
some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as
authority for the creation of substantive federal law.”190
Application of customary international law rules by federal courts often
entails many of the aspects of independent judicial law-making that are
present in the application of rules of general common law.191 As the
revisionists have demonstrated, customary international law rules are
frequently ill-defined and controversial, providing only limited direction
to courts and involving only limited participation by U.S. political
branches.192 In these circumstances, judicial application of customary
international law involves much the same type of expansive judicial lawmaking as does the application of general common law rules—and raises
the same concerns as those identified in Erie.
189. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
190. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–12
(1975); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1414–15 (2001).
191. Modernists and revisionists spar over the question whether courts “make” or “find” rules of
customary international law. Nothing should turn on the characterization. There is no disagreement
that courts must look to objective external sources (such as state practice, treaties, decisions, and
commentary) in “finding” international law, nor that this process inevitably entails a fair measure of
law-“making.”
192. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 327–31; Bradley & Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 2268–72.
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On the other hand, other rules of customary international law are welldefined and specific, and enjoy extensive support from U.S. political
branches.193 In these circumstances, Erie’s concerns about unfettered
judicial law-making are only tenuously implicated: exercising their
constitutional authority over the Nation’s foreign relations, the federal
political branches have made rules of law, which U.S. courts are able to
apply with no more judicial law-making than their application of statutory
or treaty provisions. The modernist position provides no principled means
of distinguishing between these different categories of customary
international law, and the different types of judicial action required by
different international law rules, and instead broadly approves of both.
It is no answer for modernists to cite judicial authority holding that
“international law is part of our law.”194 As the revisionists have shown,
that authority stands only for the proposition that rules of customary
international law are part of U.S. law, without addressing whether those
rules are also directly applicable in U.S. courts—just as U.S. treaties are
denominated the law of the land, without resolving whether their
provisions are self-executing.195 Moreover, pronouncements that
“international law is part of our law”196 were made in pre-Erie settings,
when limits on independent judicial law-making absent a sovereign
mandate to do so had not yet been articulated. In any event, as discussed
below, in applying customary international law during this period, U.S.
courts consistently inquired whether particular rules were intended by the
political branches to be judicially-applicable;197 the adage that
international law was part of our law did not resolve the question whether
that law was also self-executing and directly applicable in U.S. courts.
The modernist position also gives rise to serious risks of judicial
interference with the federal political branches’ conduct of foreign
relations. Judicial application of all customary international law rules,
without inquiry into political branch authorization, risks undermining the
President and Congress in their dealings with foreign states.198 As the
revisionists have demonstrated, judicial application of some rules of
customary international law—particularly “new” rules, including
193. Examples include foreign sovereign immunity, consular immunity, and treatment of aliens.
See supra section II.A.1.
194. Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1831 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900)).
195. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 822–23; supra section II.A.2.
196. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (1900).
197. See infra section II.B.1.
198. See supra section II.A.1; infra section II.B.1.
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emergent human rights protections—have significant foreign policy
implications.199 Application of those types of rules is often likely to
require U.S. courts to make inquiries into, and judgments about, foreign
sovereign actions, potentially provoking foreign protests and potential
retaliation. That is particularly true of many contemporary rules of
international human rights law, including rules regarding arbitrary
detention, capital punishment, race and gender discrimination, asylum,
and labor rights.200
The likelihood of foreign offense or retaliation is heightened by the
character of contemporary customary international law. As the
revisionists have pointed out, contemporary customary international law
rules are formed more quickly, with less evidence of state practice, than
“traditional” international law rules.201 Contemporary customary
international law rules are often based upon declarations or aspirational
statements in international forums instead of being crystallized through
state practice.202 As a consequence, contemporary rules of customary
international law are often more general, ill-defined, and aspirational than
traditional international law rules—heightening concerns about the
foreign policy consequences of judicial application of such rules.203
Reflecting these concerns, the federal courts have consistently been
reluctant to adopt rules of international law that risk judicial interference
in the political branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations. They
have instead underscored the authority of the President and Congress,
rather than the Judicial branch, over foreign relations: “[t]he conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the constitution
to the executive and legislative . . . departments.”204 As a consequence,
foreign policy decisions have “long been held to belong in the domain of
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry,”205 and courts
199. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 840–41.
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 (providing examples of emerging rules); Beth Stephens,
Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191 (1995/96).
201. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 838–40.
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102 cmt. f & reporters’ note 2; id. § 103 cmt. c & reporters’ note 3;
D’AMATO, supra note 109, at 44–46, 49–51; J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 485–86 (2000).
203. This does not, however, lead to a conclusion that all customary international law rules are
inapplicable in U.S. courts, as revisionists suggest. See supra section I.B. Rather, it is necessary to
distinguish between different rules of customary international law, examining which rules the U.S.
political branches intended to have judicial application and which rules they did not.
204. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491, 511 (2008).
205. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); see also Bank
Markazi v. Peterson, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 (2016); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,
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have eschewed applications of customary international law rules,
including in Sabbatino, that could “interfere with negotiations being
carried on by the Executive Branch.”206
These considerations provide further confirmation that the modernist
position, which presumptively requires judicial application of all rules of
customary international law, is untenable. Direct application of all
customary international law rules by U.S. courts entails not only
unauthorized judicial law-making, but judicial law-making in a context
that involves especially significant risks of interference with the political
branches’ exercise of their foreign relations authority. Because of those
risks, inquiry into the existence of political branch authorization for the
application of customary international law rules, like that required for the
provisions of treaties and other international agreements, is particularly
important.
There is also no basis for concluding that the federal political branches
have broadly authorized direct judicial application of all rules of
customary international law. On the contrary, in many instances, the
political branches have made clear that they do not want particular rules
of international law to be directly applied in U.S. courts. The United States
has ratified most human rights treaties only after attaching reservations,
declarations, or understandings confirming the treaties’ non-selfexecuting status.207 As the revisionists observe,208 it is implausible to
argue that the non-self-executing provisions of these treaties do not apply
in U.S. courts, but that parallel rules of customary international law
(derived in large part from the treaties themselves), do apply, without any
inquiry as to whether essentially the same rules of international law were
intended to be self-executing.
It is no answer to say that “international human rights [law] did not just
happen to the United States; the political branches deliberately
participated in its creation.”209 Although it is true that the federal political
branches participate in the formation of many (but not all210) rules of
customary international law, that elides the critical question: whether the
417 (2002).
206. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964).
207. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 328–29; see generally David Sloss, The
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights
Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999).
208. Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 858; Bradley & Goldsmith, Human
Rights, supra note 4, at 330–31.
209. Neuman, supra note 6, at 385.
210. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118, 1163 (2014); Young,
Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 396–97.

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1684

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

political branches have, when participating in making particular rules of
international law, authorized U.S. courts to apply those rules. Unless the
political branches have authorized judicial application of a rule of law,
whether customary international law or otherwise, the federal courts have
no authority to apply that rule. That is the lesson of Erie and its limits on
independent judicial law-making.
Conversely, where the political branches have bound the United States
to a rule of customary international law, and provided for application of
that rule in U.S. courts, then federal courts not only may, but must, apply
that rule. As discussed above, the Constitution provides the federal
political branches with broad, and exclusive, authority to act for the
United States in making customary international law and undertaking
international legal obligations on behalf of the Nation.211 Those grants of
constitutional authority complement the inherent, and inevitable, power
of the federal political branches to exercise the sovereign rights and
obligations of the United States to participate in the formation of
customary international law.212 In practice, the political branches exercise
this authority on an ongoing, continuous basis, necessarily committing the
United States to new or revised obligations under customary international
law (or declining to undertake such commitments) in the course of its
international relations.
When the political branches exercise this authority to make rules of
customary international law that are intended to have direct application in
national courts, those rules can and must be applied by U.S. courts. These
international law rules are no different in international effect than selfexecuting treaties, congressional executive agreements, or sole executive
agreements. In each case, exercising authority granted by the
Constitution,213 the Executive and Legislative branches make rules of
international law, with the status of federal law.214 And, in each case, the
structure and objectives of the Constitution provide for the possibility of

211. See supra section II.A.1.
212. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“The power to
acquire territory by discovery and occupation, the power to expel undesirable aliens, the power to
make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense, none of
which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the
conception of nationality.”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (“[T]he United
States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations;
and it was their interest as well as their duty to provide; that those laws should be respected and
obeyed; in their national character and capacity.”).
213. See supra section II.A.2; supra note 168.
214. See supra section II.A.2.
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direct application of these international law rules in U.S. courts,
depending on the intentions of the political branches.
It is no answer to say that customary international law (unlike treaties)
is not included expressly among the categories of law referred to in Article
VI’s Supremacy Clause as the “supreme Law of the Land.”215 The same
observation applies to congressional-executive agreements216 and sole
executive agreements217—both of which may also be self-executing and
directly applicable in U.S. courts, but which are also omitted from Article
VI’s express text.218 The same observation also applies to rules of federal
common law, and to regulations and similar forms of law made by federal
administrative agencies,219 all of which are unquestionably applicable in
U.S. courts notwithstanding their omission from Article VI’s text.220 The
absence of customary international law—like the absence of these other
types of federal law—from the text of Article VI is therefore not decisive.
The Constitution grants the federal political branches the authority to
make customary international law, which includes the power to make
rules of customary international law with the status of federal law that are
directly applicable in U.S. courts, just as other types of federal law, not
expressly included in Article VI, are directly applicable in U.S. courts.
Moreover, Article VI supplies an entirely satisfactory textual basis for
these conclusions. The Supremacy Clause’s provision that the
Constitution, U.S. treaties, and “the Laws of the United States which shall

215. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
216. See supra section II.A.2; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
217. See supra section II.A.2; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
218. It is also no answer to argue, as revisionists do, that customary international law is made by
the international community, while other forms of law under Article VI are made by the U.S. political
branches. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 857–58. Treaties and other
international agreements are, of course, made by foreign states (sometimes many foreign states), as
well as the United States; conversely, customary international law binding on the United States also
almost always requires assent by the U.S. political branches, albeit less formally and explicitly. More
fundamentally, the revisionist response fails to focus on the critical question, which is whether, in
assenting to a rule of customary international law, the U.S. political branches intended that rule to be
directly applicable in U.S. courts. It is these actions and intentions of U.S. political bodies, not the
world community, that are decisive in determining whether rules of international law are directly
applicable in U.S. courts (just as it is the intentions of the U.S. political branches that are decisive in
determining the self-executing status of treaties). See infra section II.B.2; infra Part III; infra Part IV.
219. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 756–65
(2010).
220. See id. at 758–65; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (noting federal
common law is “law” for purposes of statutory arising under jurisdiction; “laws” include “claims
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin”). The same rationale applies
under Article VI, and to customary international law.
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be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” are the “Law of the Land”
has given rise to substantial controversy.221 Nonetheless, the Clause
provides ample grounds for categorizing rules of customary international
law as federal law.222 Article VI’s reference to “Laws of the United States”
is not limited to “Acts” of Congress,223 and instead was drafted
expansively to extend to other forms of U.S. “Law” made pursuant to the
Constitution, including congressional-executive and sole-executive
agreements, as well as federal common law.224 As a textual matter, this
formulation encompasses rules of customary international law, made by
the federal political branches “in pursuance of” their constitutional foreign
affairs powers, and then interpreted and applied by the federal courts “in
pursuance of” their constitutional judicial authority.225 Alternatively,
grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts over international matters
(including, as discussed below, admiralty, maritime, and alienage
jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute) are readily interpreted as providing
221. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 63; Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional
Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2008); Monaghan, supra note 219.
222. Alternatively, contemporary authorities appear to have regarded customary international law
as “constitutional” in character (and therefore falling within Article VI’s reference to the
Constitution). See William R. Castro, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 528 (1986) (reprinting draft
opinion by William Paterson, treating law of nations as arising under Constitution: “[t]his is an
offence—How? By the law of nations, or, in other words, by the common law, which comprehends
the law of nations. It is too an offence arising under the constn, as distinct from an offence arising
under the law of the U. States; because we have no stat. on the subject”).
223. William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the United
States, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 21, 40 (2009) [hereinafter Dodge, After Sosa]; Peter
L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1568–71 (2008) (noting that initial
drafts of Article VI applied to “Acts,” but were revised to refer to “Laws”); cf. Clark, Sole Executive
Agreements, supra note 166, at 1575.
224. See supra section II.A.2. That reading is supported by the reference in Article VI to the “Laws
of any State,” which plainly referred to all forms of state law (not merely state statutes). Monaghan,
supra note 219, at 767; Strauss, supra note 223, at 1568–69.
225. This conclusion is not inconsistent with nineteenth century decisions suggesting that the
reference to “Laws” in Articles III and VI did not include common law rules. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co.
v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 543–45 (1828) (maritime law is not “Law” of United
States under Article III); Osborn v. President, Dirs. & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 738
(1824) (“[T]he 3d article of the Constitution . . . declares[] that ‘the judicial power shall extend to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority.’”). The critical distinction is that rules of
customary international law, which the political branches authorize U.S. courts to apply, are not
judge-made common law. Rules of customary international law are “Law” made by the political
branches, pursuant to their constitutional foreign relations powers, which the federal courts are then
authorized by specialized statutory grants of jurisdiction to apply. That provides a textual explanation
for the inclusion of both international agreements other than treaties and rules of customary
international law in Article VI’s reference to “Laws.” Cf. Monaghan, supra note 219, at 755–65
(arguing that legislation, not common law, is “made” for purposes of Article VI).
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authority for the federal courts to apply, as rules of federal “Law” under
Article VI, rules of customary international law made pursuant to those
jurisdictional grants.226
The conclusion that rules of customary international law are the “Law
of the Land” for purposes of Article VI is supported by the historic rule
that customary international law is “part of the law of the land” or “part
of our law.”227 As the revisionists have shown, this phrase did not imply
that customary international law was federal law or that it had preemptive
effects.228 Importantly, however, the phrases “part of our law” and “law
of the land” did imply that customary international law was “law” and
therefore the possibility of direct application in judicial proceedings. This
is an inherent aspect of the concept of “law,” as contemporary
commentary and judicial authority concluded, both generally229 and with
specific application to the law of nations.230 Thus, when the Framers
granted the President and Congress the constitutional authority to make
customary international law as part of their foreign affairs authority, they
did so in the context of this understanding of the concept of law. As a
consequence, rules of customary international law, made by the political
branches, were “part of our law” and applicable in U.S. courts, in the same
manner as other forms of international law.
Judicial application of rules of customary international law, when the
political branches have provided for such application, does not violate
separation of powers principles.231 On the contrary, where the political
branches have made a rule of customary international law, which they
intend to be self-executing, it would offend separation of powers
226. See infra section II.B.1; Dodge, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 187, at 689–90; Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
227. See supra section I.A; supra section II.A.2.
228. Bellia & Clark, supra note 63, at 11; see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized
Nation: The Early American Constitution, The Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 1001–02 (2010).
229. Peterson v. Davis (1848) 136 Eng. Rep. 1241, 1243 (C.B.) (“[C]onstant immemorial usage,
sanctified and recognised by the Courts of Westminster Hall, and in many instances by the legislature
[make it now] as much a part of the law of the land as any other course of practice which custom has
introduced and established.”); Fogue v. Gale (1747) 95 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.) (“[W]e cannot depart
from the practice, which is the law of the Court, and, as such, is the law of the land . . . .”); 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422; see also STORY, supra note 115, § 966.
230. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
231. Revisionists sometimes suggest that, “if customary international law can be made by practice
wholly outside the United States it has no basis in popular sovereignty at all.” See Trimble, A
Revisionist View, supra note 4, at 721. That is unconvincing. It ignores the decisive role of the U.S.
political branches in making customary international law, see supra section II.A.1, and the
requirement for political branch authorization to U.S. courts to apply those rules of international law,
see supra section II.A.2.
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principles if federal courts did not apply that rule.232 The position of the
U.S. Executive branch regarding judicial application of customary
international law rules of foreign sovereign immunity is again instructive:
“The federal government cannot effectively invoke standards of
international law to ensure continued favorable treatment by foreign
governments for American governmental property abroad if these
standards are not given effect by the political subdivisions of the United
States.”233
Nor is judicial application of customary international law in these
circumstances likely to interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations. In accepting a particular customary international law rule, the
political branches are in a position to assess the risks of interference with
U.S. foreign policy from judicial application of the rule, and to conclude
that those risks either do not exist or are outweighed by other
considerations. Indeed, the refusal of federal courts to apply rules of
international law when the political branches have provided for judicial
application of a rule would itself presumptively undermine the political
branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations. A failure of U.S.
courts to apply rules of foreign sovereign immunity, or rules of head-ofstate or consular immunity, would again provide obvious examples of this
point.
Judicial application of customary international law also offends neither
federalism interests nor democratic values when it has been provided for
by the political branches. As discussed above, the Constitution empowers
the federal political branches, and not the states, to participate in making
customary international law;234 when the political branches do so, they do
not intrude upon state sovereignty, but exercise exclusive federal
authority. Likewise, when federal courts give direct effect to customary
international law rules, as provided for by the political branches, they
apply rules of law made by organs of government elected by the entire
United States. Giving effect to those rules advances, rather than detracts
from, constitutional values.
* **
In sum, the Constitution provides the federal government—as
distinguished from the several states—with broad, largely exclusive,
authority over U.S. foreign relations in Articles I and II. Given this
expansive federal authority, and the compelling need for the Nation to
232. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1845 (“Bradley and Goldsmith’s approach creates,
rather than alleviates, separation of powers concerns.”).
233. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 40, Republic of Argentina v. City
of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252 (N.Y. 1969).
234. See supra section II.A.1.
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speak with “one voice” about the existence and content of customary
international law and U.S. international legal obligations, the proposition
that customary international law is generally a matter of state law is
untenable. Rather, all rules of customary international law, and their
applicability in U.S. courts, are matters of federal law, subject to uniform
interpretation by the federal courts.
At the same time, notwithstanding the status of customary international
law as federal law, the Constitution also limits the authority of U.S. courts
to apply particular rules of customary international law. That is true for
the same reasons that only “self-executing” provisions of U.S. treaties and
other international agreements apply directly in U.S. courts, even though
such agreements have the status of federal law. Thus, the proposition that
all rules of customary international law are presumptively applicable in
U.S. courts is also untenable. Rather, as with U.S. treaties and other
international agreements, further inquiry is required to determine whether,
in accepting a customary international law rule, the U.S. political branches
intended that rule to be self-executing and directly applicable in U.S.
courts, without the need for further legislative action.
B.

Judicial Authority

The foregoing analysis provides the most satisfactory explanation of
U.S. judicial authority applying customary international law. That
authority is extensive, with multiple strands of precedent, much of which
was decided in historical settings that differ materially from contemporary
America. Nonetheless, this authority adopts analysis and reaches results
generally paralleling those set forth above. Under this approach, U.S.
courts have routinely applied rules of customary international law,
effectively treating them as national law, but only after concluding that
the federal political branches had provided for judicial application of these
rules. Conversely, this authority is inconsistent with central elements of
both the modernist and revisionist positions, as well as the various other
alternatives that have been proposed for the treatment of customary
international law.
1.

Separation of Powers

U.S. courts have applied customary international law since the
beginning of the Republic, in decisions too numerous to cite.235 Contrary
235. See Edwin Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT’L
L. 239, 259 (1932) (in its first thirty years of existence, the Supreme Court decided eighty-two cases
raising issues of international law); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1690

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

to both the modernist and revisionist positions, however, U.S. courts have
generally applied particular customary international law rules only after
inquiring whether the political branches had, either expressly or
impliedly, provided for judicial application of those rules, undertaking an
analysis analogous to that used in determining whether a treaty provision
is self-executing.236 In doing so, U.S. courts have examined a variety of
factors, including the content and character of the relevant rule of
customary international law and the actions and statements of the political
branches regarding that rule.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rose v. Himely237 illustrates the early
approach of U.S. courts to international law. Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion addressed three questions of what was regarded as contemporary
customary international law.238 First, the Court held that international law
entitled the courts of one nation to consider whether a court of another
nation had properly exercised jurisdiction in rendering a judgment.239
Second, Chief Justice Marshall held that international law entitled a
nation’s courts to deny recognition of a judgment regarding property that
was never within the rendering court’s territorial jurisdiction,240 and that
U.S. courts could not recognize a St. Domingo court’s judgment rendered
in these circumstances.241 Third, the Court also held that the question
whether St. Domingo was an independent sovereign state, or a French
colony, was an issue of international law that was for the political
branches, not the courts, to decide.242
Importantly, the Court’s decision in Rose distinguished between rules
of international law that were addressed to courts (the first two issues
noted above)243 and rules that were addressed to the political branches of
Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L. J. 855, 872 (2005)
(in its first forty-five years of existence, 25% of the Supreme Court’s decisions involved foreign
affairs).
236. See infra section II.B.1.
237. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
238. The law of nations was broadly defined in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to
include what came to be regarded as private international law and public international law. Edwin D.
Dickinson, Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26,
26–29 (1952); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231,
1263–64 (1985).
239. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 271.
240. Id. at 276–77.
241. Id. at 278–79.
242. Id. at 272.
243. Id. at 271 (“[I]t is apparent that the courts of that country [England] hold themselves warranted
in examining the jurisdiction of a foreign court, by which a sentence of condemnation has passed, not
only in relation to the constitutional powers of the court, but also in relation to the situation of the
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government (the third issue).244 The Court was prepared to apply the first
two rules of international law directly (and to hold, as a consequence, that
the St. Domingo judgment had not conferred valid title), but it was
unwilling to apply the third rule (holding that this rule was “obviously
addressed to sovereigns, not to courts”).245 The Court’s decision treated
the relevant rules of customary international law differently, in each
instance based almost entirely on the content and character of those rules
and, in particular, whether the rule was “addressed to” courts, as opposed
to political branches.246
A similar approach to international law was adopted in Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon,247 which considered “the very delicate and
important inquiry, whether an American citizen can assert, in an American
court, a title to an armed national vessel [of another nation] found within
the waters of the United States.”248 In answering this question in the
negative, applying a rule that would become the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity, the Court again relied upon three rules of customary
international law.
First, Chief Justice Marshall held that a nation possesses absolute
jurisdiction over its own territory: “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”249 The Court
declared that this rule of international law applied to courts as well as other
organs of the Nation, reasoning that a court’s jurisdiction was “a branch
of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign

thing on which those powers are exercised; at least so far as the right of the foreign court to take
jurisdiction of the thing is regulated by the law of nations and by treaties. There is no reason to suppose
that the tribunals of any other country whatever deny themselves the same power. It is, therefore, at
present, considered as the uniform practice of civilized nations, and is adopted by this court as the
true principle which ought to govern in this case.”) (emphasis added); id. at 276–77 (“[I]f [a court]
exercises a jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, its sovereign could not confer, however
available its sentences may be within the dominions of the prince from who the authority is derived,
they are not regarded by foreign courts. This distinction is taken upon this principle, that the law of
nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations, and is supposed to be equally understood
by all.”) (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 272 (“[T]he doctrines of Vattel have been particularly referred to. But the language of
that writer is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to courts. It is for governments to decide whether
they will consider St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision shall be made, . . .
courts of justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered . . . .”).
245. Id. at 272.
246. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited only international law authority (Vattel), referring
to neither the Constitution nor constitutional separation of powers principles. Id. at 271–72.
247. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
248. Id. at 135.
249. Id. at 136.
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power,”250 and therefore subject to the general principle of territoriality.
Second, the Court held that nations could either expressly or impliedly
consent to limitations on their territorial jurisdiction,251 and that “by
common usage, and by common opinion, growing out of that usage,”252
nations had expressed such consent by not exercising territorial
“jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sovereign entering
a port open for their reception.”253 Finally, the Court also held that:
[The] sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this
implication [of consent], but that until such power be exerted in a
manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be
considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a
jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to exercise.254
As with Rose, the Court’s opinion directly applied customary
international law in order to deny an otherwise valid claim to title under
U.S. law. In doing so, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the rules of
international law were addressed to, and applicable in, national courts—
namely, territorial jurisdictional limits and immunity of foreign warships
from local judicial jurisdiction.255 Likewise, the Court acknowledged that
international law permitted states to revoke this immunity, but held that
the decision to do so involved “rather questions of policy than of law,”
and was “for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.”256 Again like Rose,
focusing on the content and character of particular international law
rules,257 the Court treated some rules of international law as being
addressed to national courts (which the Court applied) and others as being
addressed to, and capable of being invoked or applied by, the political
branches (which the Court did not apply).258
250. Id.
251. Id. at 136–37.
252. Id. at 136.
253. Id. at 144 (recognizing the “principle of public law, that national ships of war, entering the
port of a friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by the consent of
that power from its jurisdiction”).
254. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
255. See id. at 136, 144 (territorial jurisdiction of courts; immunity of foreign warship from judicial
jurisdiction); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 299 (1822) (for foreign nations, “all
the departments of the government make but one sovereignty”).
256. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
257. As in Rose, the Court relied only on international authority (Vattel and Bynkershoek), and did
not refer to the U.S. Constitution or constitutional separation of powers principles.
258. The Court’s treatment of foreign sovereign immunity was subsequently applied generally,
outside the context of prize cases, to all categories of jurisdiction in U.S. courts. See Berizzi Bros. Co.
v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882); United
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 525 (1875). It was also applied in state courts. See Kline v. Kaneko,
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U.S. courts adopted the same approach to customary international law
in prize cases. Both modernists and revisionists have devoted only limited
attention to prize decisions.259 That lack of attention is surprising, because
prize disputes formed a highly important part of the U.S. courts’
international caseload during the early nineteenth century,260 with courts
routinely applying customary international law rules,261 and because the
treatment of international law in these decisions parallels its treatment in
other fields. Prize decisions were rendered pursuant to legislation giving
federal courts jurisdiction over “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction,”262 and, in prize cases, exclusive jurisdiction.263 This
jurisdictional grant was understood as both authorizing and requiring U.S.
courts to apply customary international law rules governing issues of
neutrality, prize, and capture, which they routinely did.264 Again,
however, U.S. courts did so only after inquiring whether particular rules
of international law were directly applicable in U.S. courts, focusing
principally on the content and character of such rules.

535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (“[L]ogic mandates that courts be bound by the State
Department’s recommendation.”); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 56 N.E.2d 577, 580 (N.Y.
1944).
259. See, Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 827 n.74 (addressing the decisions
in passing); Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1830 & n.33 (addressing the decisions in passing).
260. See supra note 235; David Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
31, 33 (1995) (in the early nineteenth century, “the law of prize was the law of nations”); Lavinbuk,
supra note 235, at 872.
261. See William R. Castro, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in An Age of Privateers,
Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993). There was extensive contemporary
commentary on the application of international law by U.S. prize courts. See H. WHEATON, A DIGEST
OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURE AND PRIZE (1815).
262. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 77. It was undisputed that “[i]n cases of prize . . . the
courts of admiralty have an undisturbed and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same according
to the law of nations.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108; see also STORY, supra note
115, § 865 (“[C]ourts of common law [were] bound to abstain from any decision on questions of this
sort.”).
263. Castro, supra note 261, at 121–22, 129–35, 139–49; Harrington Putnam, How the Federal
Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 467–70 (1925).
264. See The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (1815) (“The Court of prize is
emphatically a Court of the law of nations; and it takes neither its character nor its rules from the mere
municipal regulations of any country.”); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191,
198 (1815) (“The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting
belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial states, throughout
Europe and America.”); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (federal court has
jurisdiction to determine “whether such restitution can be made consistently with the laws of nations
and the treaties and laws of the United States”); Bederman, supra note 260, at 51 (“[F]rom time
immemorial, when a national court adjudicated a case of a maritime capture it was obliged to follow
international law.”).
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In The Nereide,265 for example, the Supreme Court affirmed its
authority, and obligation, to apply international law in prize cases. Chief
Justice Marshall held that the law of nations treated the property of
neutrals as neutral, and therefore exempt from capture, even if that
property was shipped on the vessels of belligerents.266 His opinion
explained that “congress has not left it to this department to say whether
the rule of foreign nations shall be applied to them, but has by law applied
that rule.”267 Although the captors argued that the Court should apply an
exception to the applicable rule of neutrality, because the putative neutral
cargo owner’s home state (Spain) applied such an exception, the Court
refused, on the basis that this was an exception for the political branches
to invoke. It reasoned:
If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain any rule
respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the
government will manifest that will by passing an act for the
purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law
of nations which is a part of the law of the land.268
As in Rose and Schooner Exchange, the Court both confirmed its
authority to apply customary international law as the “law of the land”
when so intended by the political branches, and denied its authority to
apply such rules of international law without such political direction.
Likewise, in determining when the judiciary was authorized to apply a
particular customary international law rule, the Court again looked to the
content and character of the rule, evaluating to which branch of
government the rule was addressed.
Similarly, in Brown v. United States,269 Chief Justice Marshall
considered whether the property of an enemy national, located on U.S.
territory, could be seized following a declaration of war. The Court first
addressed the claim that the President could not violate “the modern law
of nations,” which assertedly forbid such seizures.270 The Court refused to
consider the argument, reasoning that the relevant rules of international
265. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
266. Id. at 426.
267. Id. at 423.
268. Id. Elsewhere, the Court reasoned:
[R]eciprocating to the subjects of a nation, or retaliating on them, its unjust proceedings towards
our citizens, is a political not a legal measure. It is for consideration of the government not of its
Courts. . . . It is not for us to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us, and to tread the
devious and intricate path of politics.
Id. at 422–23.
269. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
270. Id. at 147.
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law regarding seizures of enemy property were addressed to the U.S.
political branches, not to U.S. courts. In analysis paralleling that used to
distinguish between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,271 the
Court concluded:
This argument must assume for its basis the position that modern
usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself
by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This
position is not allowed. This usage is a guide which the sovereign
follows or abandons at his will. The rule, like other precepts of
morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the
judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded
by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.272
As with prior prize decisions, and with U.S. treaties, the Court applied
rules of customary international law but distinguished between those rules
of international law that were addressed to, and directly applicable by, the
judicial branch and those that were addressed to the political branches.273
The Court concluded that, under the Constitution, the decision whether to
confiscate property, on land, of an enemy national was one for
Congress,274 not the judiciary or the President, and that Congress had not
approved confiscations of property in these circumstances.

271. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“[W]hen the terms of the stipulation import
a contract, . . . the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”) (emphasis added);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244 (1796) (“No one can doubt that a treaty may stipulate, that
certain acts shall be done by the Legislature; that other acts shall be done by the Executive; and others
by the Judiciary.”) (emphasis added).
272. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128 (emphasis added).
273. The same analysis is reflected in La Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 385 (1820), which
held that, although U.S. courts will restore a prize, captured in violation of U.S. neutrality, to its
owner, they will not entertain other claims arising from an allegedly unlawful capture. Justice Story
reasoned that, even if a capture violated the law of nations, “it cannot be a matter of judicial complaint,
that they are exercised with severity, even if the parties do transcend those rules which the customary
laws of war justify.” Id. at 390. The Court reasoned that such claims “have never been held within the
cognizance of the prize tribunals of neutral nations,” and that “[u]ntil Congress shall choose to
prescribe a different rule, this Court will, in cases of this nature, confine itself to the exercise of the
simple authority to decree restitution, and decline all inquiries into questions of damages for asserted
wrongs.” Id. The rationale of La Amistad was again that some customary international law rules were
addressed to, and applicable by, U.S. courts, but that other rules were not. See also United States v.
Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 711–12 (1832) (applying rule of international law regarding
acquisition of territory, which was otherwise addressed to political branches, based on specific
statutory authorization).
274. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 716 (1900) (“When war breaks out, the question, What
shall be done with enemy property in our country?—is a question rather of policy than of law. . . . [I]t
is proper for the consideration of a department which can modify it at will; not for the consideration
of a department which can pursue only the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the
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The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in its 1900 decision in
The Paquete Habana,275 which considered the legality of a U.S. gunboat’s
seizure of two Spanish fishing vessels as prizes of war. The Court first
observed that, by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation, it was “the general
policy of the government to conduct the war in accordance with the
principles of international law.”276 The Court then reviewed an extensive
body of state practice and commentary, concluding that:
[B]y the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an
established rule of international law, founded on considerations
of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the
mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing
vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews,
unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching
and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of
war.277
The Court reasoned that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,” but
continued, noting that international law “must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”278 The Court emphasized that the rule of international law
which it had identified “is one which prize courts administering the law
of nations are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the
absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government.”279 The
Court concluded with the declaration that “it is the duty of this court,
sitting as the highest prize court of the United States, and administering
the law of nations,”280 to hold the capture unlawful.
legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.”).
275. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
276. Id. at 712 (citing and quoting Presidential Proclamation No. 6, 30 Stat. 1769 (Apr. 22, 1898));
see id. at 700. Modernists sometimes suggest that “[t]he century-old case of The Paquete Habana is
but one example of a routine Supreme Court decision that enforced a rule of customary international
law against an executive official, without a trace of separation of powers concerns.” Koh, State Law?,
supra note 6, at 1842. That is inaccurate. The Court was particularly attentive to the President’s
express incorporation of international law by the Presidential Proclamation and to its own role as a
prize court—a role authorized by Congress and the President which permitted the Court to apply the
law of nations.
277. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708.
278. Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The Court qualified this reference to international law with the
further comment that, “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.” Id.
279. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 714.
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Although routinely cited by modernists,281 Paquete Habana instead
supports a more nuanced approach to the status of customary international
law in U.S. courts. The decision confirmed the authority of U.S. courts to
apply rules of international law directly, but only when Congress and the
President had so directed. That was made clear by the Court’s emphasis
upon the special character of federal jurisdiction over prize cases and the
Presidential Proclamation providing for application of international
law.282 It was also made clear by the Court’s numerous references to the
political branches’ ultimate authority over issues of customary
international law, repeatedly referring to the “absence of any treaty or
other public act of their own government in relation to the matter.”283
Although Paquete Habana stands for the proposition that U.S. courts may
apply customary international law, it also makes clear that they may do so
only in some circumstances, and in particular only where the political
branches have provided for judicial application of a rule.
Outside the context of prize cases, other nineteenth century decisions
adopted the same basic approach to customary international law. In Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co.,284 the Supreme Court applied what would later
become known as the act of state doctrine. The Court first held that
“clearly settled principles of law” established that recognition of foreign
states was a decision for Congress and the President, which was “not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”285 The Court then held that
“principles of international law” established that:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.286
The Court emphasized that these “principles of international law” were
applicable “in the courts” of independent states and “rest[ed] at last upon

281. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1842; Neuman, supra note 6, at 374; Henkin,
International Law as Law, supra note 20, at 1555.
282. 175 U.S. at 708, 710, 712 (holding that the presidential proclamation issued on April 26, 1898
during the war with Spain “clearly manifest[ed] the general policy of the Government to conduct the
war in accordance with the principles of international law sanctioned by the recent practice of
nations”) (citing Proclamation No. 7, 30 Stat. 1770 (Apr. 26, 1898)).
283. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 708.
284. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
285. Id. at 302.
286. Id. at 303 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
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the highest considerations of international comity and expediency.”287 The
Court again relied on the character and content of the international law
rules that it identified, which were addressed specifically to national
courts: “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory.”288 Other early
act of state decisions were to the same effect in describing the act of state
doctrine as a rule of international law and that this rule was directly
applicable in U.S. courts.289
In the twentieth century, judicial authority generally adopted the same
approach, only applying particular rules of international law when
expressly or impliedly authorized by the political branches. In applying
maritime law in The Western Maid,290 for example, Justice Holmes
explained:
[W]e must realize that however ancient may be the traditions of
maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been
drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from
having been accepted and adopted by the United States. There is
no mystic over-law to which even the United States must bow.
When a case is said to be governed by foreign law or by general
maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this
purpose the sovereign power takes up a rule suggested from
without and makes it part of its own rules.291
This analysis parallels that outlined above, in Rose, Schooner Exchange,
and elsewhere, as well as that applied to U.S. treaties and other
international agreements; all of these authorities recognize that the
political branches may adopt a rule of international law, but that, until they
do so, and provide for judicial application of the rule, U.S. courts have no
authority to apply the rule.
More recent judicial decisions have adopted the same approach even
more explicitly. Invariably, post-Erie discussion centers on Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,292 where Justice Harlan formulated, and
then applied, the modern act of state doctrine to decline inquiry into the

287. Id. at 302–04. The Supreme Court later held, in Sabbatino, that the act of state doctrine was
not a rule of customary international law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–
22, 421 n.22, 427 (1964). The Court adopted a different view in Oetjen, Underhill, and other earlier
decisions.
288. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added).
289. Underhill, 168 U.S. 250; Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
290. 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
291. Id. at 432.
292. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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lawfulness of a Cuban expropriation of property within Cuban territory.
In the Court’s words, the “act of state doctrine . . . precludes the courts of
this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized
foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”293 Perhaps
inevitably, the Court’s decision has been invoked by both modernists294
and revisionists;295 properly interpreted, however, the decision does not
support either position.
The Sabbatino Court first made clear that the act of state doctrine was
not a rule of customary international law, rejecting the contrary holdings
in Oetjen and other early act of state decisions.296 Instead, the Court held
that the doctrine was mandated by separation of powers concerns, aimed
at preventing judicial interference in the political branches’ conduct of
U.S. foreign relations.297 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Harlan went
out of his way298 to hold that the act of state doctrine was federal law,
using reasoning that is invariably cited in modernist writings. He quoted,
with evident approval, a law review article written by Judge Jessup a year
after Erie, which “cautioned that rules of international law should not be
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.”299 The Court
then went on to say that this “basic rationale is equally applicable to the
act of state doctrine.”300
Importantly, however, the Sabbatino Court also held that the act of state
doctrine precluded a U.S. court from applying customary international
law to assess the validity of the Cuban expropriation. While recognizing
that “United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in

293. Id. at 401.
294. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1834; Neuman, supra note 6, at 378.
295. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 859.
296. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421–22, 421 n.22, 427. Cf. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302–03.
297. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423–28.
298. Justice Harlan noted that the Court “could, perhaps, in this diversity action, avoid the question
of deciding whether federal or state law is applicable to this aspect of the litigation,” because New
York courts had adopted a version of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 424. But the Court held instead
that it was essential to apply federal law to the question whether the customary international law rules
relied upon by Sabbatino could be applied in U.S. courts.
299. Id. at 425.
300. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also went on to cite decisions adopting rules of federal
common law (e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D’Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942)) and then declared that:
[T]he act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike, but
compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution, [and its] continuing vitality depends
on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427–28.
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appropriate circumstances,”301 the Court nonetheless declined to do so in
Sabbatino, reasoning that:
[T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning
a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is
for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts
can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact, rather than on the sensitive task of
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest
or with international justice. It is also evident that some aspects
of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves
than do others; the less important the implications of an issue are
for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for
exclusivity in the political branches.302
Based on these conclusions about the content of the relevant international
law rules, the Court held that it would not examine the validity of the
Cuban expropriation under international law.303
The Court’s analysis was precisely in keeping with the historic
approach to customary international law in the United States. Justice
Harlan acknowledged that international law was potentially applicable in
U.S. courts, but also held that it would only be applied when the federal
political branches had provided for judicial application of a particular rule
of international law. As in Rose, Schooner Exchange, and Paquete
Habana, the Court focused principally on the content and character of the
relevant international law rule, including the degree of codification of the
rule, the consensus regarding the rule, the risk of foreign relations
interference, and the historic position of the political branches.304
This analysis does not support, and instead squarely contradicts, the
modernist position that all customary international law is applicable in
301. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
302. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 428 (“Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and allencompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity
of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates
customary international law.”). The Court emphasized the historic role of the Executive branch in
espousing claims against foreign states and the risks that judicial consideration of expropriation
claims would undermine or conflict with Executive branch efforts. Id. at 432–34.
304. As discussed above, the Court adopted different views of the act of state doctrine in Oetjen
(which treated the doctrine as a rule of international law) and Sabbatino (which treated the doctrine
as constitutionally-based). The critical point, however, is that, while adopting different rationales, in
each case the Court looked to the character of particular rules of customary international law to
determine whether they could be applied in U.S. courts.
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U.S. courts (as some modernists have recognized305). The Court’s analysis
also does not support the revisionist claim that customary international
law is applicable in U.S. courts only when expressly authorized by
congressional legislation or a treaty.306 Instead, Sabbatino made clear that
customary international law would be applied by U.S. courts in a more
expansive category of cases, depending upon factors that went well
beyond express legislative authorization. As detailed above, these factors
focused on the character and content of the relevant international law rule
and the historic practice of the political branches (without requiring
express legislative authorization).307
Most recently, the Supreme Court adopted substantially the same
approach in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,308 holding that the Alien Tort
Statute309 authorized federal courts “to hear claims in a very limited
category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”310
Again, although both modernists and revisionists have claimed support
from the Court’s opinion,311 it provides only limited assistance to either,
instead adopting a more nuanced approach.
The Sosa Court affirmed that, upon independence, the United States
“were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state,”312 and that
“the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”313
The Court then distinguished between different aspects of the law of
nations, categorizing some rules as addressed to “the executive and

305. See, e.g., Stephens, Law of Our Land, supra note 6, at 450 (Sabbatino “cited The Paquete
Habana in support of the proposition that ‘it is, of course, true that United States courts apply
international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances . . . .’ Whether a particular case
presents ‘appropriate circumstances’ may be subject to considerable debate” (internal citation
omitted)).
306. See supra section I.B; supra section II.A.2. It was clear that the Sabbatino Court did not hold
that there was no applicable rule of international law, but rather that judicial application of such a rule
had not been authorized. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428–29 n.26 (“We do not, of course, mean to say that
there is no international standard in this area; we conclude only that the matter is not meet for
adjudication by domestic tribunals.”).
307. Other decisions adopted comparable analyses, affirming the possibility that customary
international law rules apply directly in U.S. courts, but requiring evidence of authorization by the
political branches. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1994);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980).
308. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
309. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
310. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
311. See supra Part I; supra notes 11–14.
312. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796)).
313. Id. at 729.
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legislative domains, not the judicial,”314 and other rules as falling “within
the judicial sphere”315 or “admitting of a judicial remedy.”316 According
to Justice Souter, in adopting the Alien Tort Statute, Congress did not
intend merely to grant federal courts jurisdiction, but also to authorize
federal courts to apply international law to a “modest set of actions”
recognized at the time as violations of the law of nations.317
Finally, the Sosa Court held that nothing “categorically precluded
federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an
element of common law,” but that “a restrained conception” of this federal
judicial authority should be used when courts consider “a new cause of
action of this kind.”318 The Court concluded that this legislatively
mandated restraint required “any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”319 The Court cited
Erie and emphasized the need generally “to look for legislative guidance
before exercising innovative authority over substantive law,”320 and to
consider “the practical consequences of making that cause [of action]
available to litigants in the federal courts.”321 Applying this standard, the
Court had little difficulty in concluding that Sosa’s claims did not rest on
rules of customary international law that Congress had authorized the
federal courts to apply.322
The Court’s opinion in Sosa provides very limited support to the
modernists and revisionists, and instead adopts analysis paralleling that in
this Article. On the one hand, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion
that all customary international law rules are directly applicable in U.S.
courts, holding instead that federal courts can only apply a “very limited”
or “modest” set of rules under the Alien Tort Statute. That squarely
contradicts the core of the modern position, which is that all customary

314. Id. at 714.
315. Id. at 715.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 720; see also id. at 721 (“[T]he ATS was meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow set
of common law actions derived from the law of nations.”); id. at 724, 728–29.
318. Id. at 725; see also id. at 729 (ATS permits “further independent judicial recognition of
actionable international norms”).
319. Id. at 725; see also id. at 731 (emphasizing need for “definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations”).
320. Id. at 726.
321. Id. at 732–33.
322. Id. at 738.

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS

1703

international law is “our law,” presumptively applicable and preemptive
in U.S. courts.
On the other hand, the Sosa Court also affirmed that some customary
international law rules could be applied directly by U.S. courts, without
express, or comparably specific, statutory authorization. In doing so, the
Court focused on the content and character of particular rules of
customary international law (including the specificity and unanimity of a
particular rule) to determine whether judicial application was appropriate.
This approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the revisionist insistence
on specific legislative authorization for judicial application of
international law norms, instead recognizing what Justice Souter termed
in Sosa as the “discretion” of federal courts to undertake the “independent
judicial recognition of actionable international norms,” based principally
on the content of the relevant international law rule.323 That “independent”
judicial “discretion” is impossible to reconcile with the revisionist
analysis.
The Sosa Court’s analysis again produces a result that is precisely
consistent with the approach in Rose, Schooner Exchange, Paquete
Habana, and Sabbatino, as well as that proposed in this Article. This
analysis provides for direct judicial application of some, but not all, rules
of customary international law, based upon an evaluation of the character
and content of those rules and on the actions and intentions of the federal
political branches. In addition to ensuring compliance with limits on
independent judicial law-making, this approach parallels that used in
determining whether provisions of U.S. treaties and other international
agreements are self-executing, and ensures consistency in the treatment of
all international law rules in U.S. courts.
2.

Federalism

Judicial precedent also confirms that rules of customary international
law are rules of federal law. It is true, of course, that pre-Erie decisions
usually categorized customary international law as “general common law”
rather than federal (or state) law.324 As discussed above, however, that
categorization presents, but does not answer, the question of how
customary international law should be characterized in an era in which
there is no longer any general federal common law. In answering this

323. Id. at 729; see supra section II.B.1. Prior to Sosa, the revisionists were also adamant that the
ATS did not provide a basis for federal courts to make or apply rules of customary international law
as federal law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 345–46.
324. See supra section I.B; supra section II.A.2.
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question, since Erie gave the issue importance, U.S. courts have
consistently categorized rules of international law as rules of federal law.
There is no dispute that, prior to Erie, various rules of the law of nations
had the status of “general common law,” with federal and state courts free
to interpret these rules as they considered appropriate.325 Likewise,
various rules of the law of nations were held not to constitute federal law
for purposes of statutory “arising under” jurisdiction.326 This clearly
reflected the dominant approach toward customary international law prior
to Erie.327
On the other hand, some pre-Erie decisions appeared to treat customary
international law as applicable in state, as well as federal, courts. As
discussed above, Schooner Exchange announced a rule of foreign
sovereign immunity that limited the jurisdiction of “an American court,”
not a federal court.328 Moreover, the rationale for the Court’s decision—
ensuring the Nation’s respect for the law of nations and sovereignty of
foreign states—applied equally to federal and state courts; not
surprisingly, state and federal courts applied foreign sovereign immunity
with equal force.329
The same observations apply to the Supreme Court’s act of state
decisions. Early act of state decisions applied what the Court
characterized as principles of customary international law, supported by
observations about judicial interference in the Nation’s foreign relations,
to articulate a rule generally applicable to “the courts of one country,” not
merely federal courts.330 As Sabbatino later held, the rationale for this rule
was equally applicable in both state and federal courts.331 Similarly,
federal courts’ prize decisions were effectively federal law, given the
grants of exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction in the field.332 In

325. See Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1924); Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892); United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524–28 (1875).
326. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1876) (the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction to consider claims arising under “general laws of war, as recognized by the law of
nations,” because claims did not arise under “the constitution, laws, treaties or executive
proclamations, of the United States”).
327. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U.S. 768, 769 (1884).
328. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
329. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 113
(2nd ed. 2003).
330. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,
252 (1897).
331. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416–17 (1964).
332. See supra section II.B.1; supra note 262.
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practice, therefore, much of the customary international law applied by
U.S. courts prior to Erie was effectively national law, not state law.
More fundamentally, pre-Erie judicial authority offers very limited
assistance in determining whether customary international law rules are
state or federal law, because pre-Erie courts treated international law as
something else entirely: general common law. This characterization does
little to address the question of how international law should be
categorized if not as general common law. Moreover, this characterization
of international law occurred in the context of a conception of law, and a
relation of state and federal courts, that blurred or disregarded
contemporary distinctions between state and federal law, instead
conceiving of state and federal courts as being engaged in a cooperative
endeavor to find an external corpus of customary international law.333
Only when Erie abandoned that endeavor and its underlying conception
of general common law did the status of international law as state or
federal law become important.
After the issue became important, post-Erie judicial authority provided
relatively clear treatment of the status of customary international law. As
discussed above, Sabbatino unequivocally endorsed the conclusion that
“rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps
parochial state interpretations,” and then used that conclusion as the basis
for holding that the act of state doctrine “equally” should be characterized
as a rule of federal law.334 That decision leaves no serious doubt that rules
of customary international law are rules of federal common law;335 efforts
to explain this aspect of Sabbatino on other grounds are revisionist
history.336

333. See Young, Sorting Out, supra note 19, at 394 (“By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, the general commercial law had become de facto preemptive of contrary state rules – as, in
fact, had some of the more clearly ‘international’ portions of the law of nations.”); William A.
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1575–76 (1984) (“Even if the Court had no legal authority
over the state courts on questions of general common law, it had a prominent, central and respected
position in the American legal system . . . the state and federal courts created a remarkably uniform
American law of marine insurance.”).
334. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425, 427.
335. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1833–34; Neuman, supra note 6, at 376.
336. See Bradley & Goldsmith, International Law, supra note 4, at 859–60. The suggestion that
Sabbatino “only” held that the act of state doctrine, and not rules of customary international law, is
federal law is particularly difficult to follow. The Court held that the act of state doctrine was a rule
of federal common law in order to ensure a uniform approach to the question when customary
international law rules would be applied by U.S. federal and state courts. The notion that this issue
must be subject to a uniform federal rule, but the underlying rules of customary international law
would not be, is untenable.

04 - Born.docx (Do Not Delete)

1706

12/28/2017 9:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1641

Other post-Erie decisions have confirmed that customary international
law is federal law. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio
Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”),337 the Supreme Court adopted a rule of
corporate attribution for companies owned by foreign states, formulating
principles “common to both international law and federal common
law.”338 The Court applied these federal common law rules, derived from
international law, notwithstanding the fact that no federal legislation
addressed the issue339 and that state (and foreign) law did address the
issue.340 Likewise, the Court’s opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain made
clear that the content of the customary international law claims that were
authorized under the Alien Tort Statute—and the question whether those
claims were in fact so authorized—were governed by federal law.341 In
Justice Souter’s words, citing Sabbatino and other federal common law
authorities, “Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new
substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie
understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may
derive some substantive law in a common law way.”342
These authorities are also consistent with more general standards
governing the development of federal common law rules. Those standards
have been discussed extensively elsewhere,343 and their application here
follows non-controversially from the discussion above. In summary, the
Nation’s foreign relations and international legal obligations are an area
“involving ‘uniquely federal interests’ . . . committed by the Constitution
and laws of the United States to federal control.”344 That is confirmed by

337. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
338. Id. at 623.
339. As the Court noted, the FSIA did not prescribe any rule regarding the attribution of corporate
responsibility. Id. at 620. On the other hand, as in prize cases and cases under the ATS, the Court was
exercising jurisdiction pursuant to a grant of subject matter jurisdiction directed specifically at
international disputes (i.e., the FSIA). Id. at 619.
340. Id. at 622; id. at 622 n.11.
341. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
342. Id. at 729–30 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
(“[I]nternational disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations” are an area where
“federal common law” rules are appropriate.)); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723, 730. Revisionist
suggestions that Sosa did not adopt a rule of federal common law are also untenable. See Dodge, After
Sosa, supra note 223.
343. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
344. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
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the holdings in Sabbatino, Sosa, Garamendi, and elsewhere.345 Moreover,
as also discussed above,346 independent state court decisions about the
content of international law (and U.S. international legal obligations)
undermine, and conflict with, federal authority in the field and the ability
of the federal government to speak with one voice.347 As the Court
declared in Sabbatino, Bancec and Sosa, this provides ample basis for
treating customary international law as a matter of federal common law.
These decisions and the analysis outlined above are impossible to
reconcile with the limited conception of federal common law at the heart
of the revisionist position. Rather, Sabbatino and its progeny declare
broadly that “rules of international law” must be treated as federal law,
not subject to “divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.”348
That, of course, does not resolve the question of whether these rules of
federal law are applicable directly in U.S. courts, which requires separate
analysis. But it does make clear that rules of international law, like the act
of state doctrine, were not what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
decided Erie.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: NON-SELFEXECUTING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
As discussed above, both constitutional text and purposes, as well as
judicial authority, require characterizing all rules of customary
international law as federal law, rather than state (or foreign) law.
Notwithstanding that conclusion, the same sources also provide that U.S.
courts (both federal and state) may not apply a rule of customary
international law unless the federal political branches have provided for
judicial application of the rule. This approach treats all international legal
obligations of the United States—treaties, other international agreements,
and customary international law—in the same basic manner, and ensures
observance of Erie’s limits on the federal courts’ law-making authority.
In doing so, this approach safeguards both federal authority over the
Nation’s foreign relations and constitutional limits on unauthorized lawmaking by the judiciary.
The approach outlined above can be readily applied and produces
sensible, consistent results. As discussed below, this approach permits

345. See supra section II.A.2; supra section II.B.1.
346. See supra section II.A.1.
347. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (“[T]he guiding principle is that a significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically
shown.”); Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. at 640.
348. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
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some, but not all, rules of customary international law to be given direct
effect in U.S. courts, depending on the character and content of those rules
and the intentions of the federal political branches. In particular, this
analysis requires determining whether the political branches have
expressly or impliedly provided for U.S. courts to apply a particular rule
of customary international law. More specifically, the analysis requires
inquiry into considerations paralleling those that apply when determining
whether a U.S. treaty or other international agreement is self-executing.
This analysis differs in critical respects from both the modernist and
revisionist positions. Unlike both the modernists and revisionists, this
analysis treats all rules of customary international law as federal law,
regardless of whether those rules are directly applicable in U.S. courts.349
This analysis also differs from the modernist position by requiring an
inquiry into political branch approval of judicial application of customary
international law, rather than concluding that the federal courts’
constitutional authority to make federal common law independently
authorizes application of all rules of customary international law
applicable in U.S. courts.350 Conversely, the analysis outlined below also
differs from the revisionist position by providing a less categorical, more
expansive approach to determining when the political branches have
provided for judicial application of a rule of customary international
law.351 Not surprisingly, this analysis produces results that differ from
both the modernist and revisionist positions, providing for more frequent
application of customary international law than the revisionists and less
frequent application than the modernists.
A.

No Clear Statement or Legislative Act Requirement

Preliminarily, and contrary to some statements of the revisionist
position,352 the analysis proposed above does not limit U.S. courts to
applying customary international law only when expressly authorized to
do so by congressional legislation or a treaty. That position, adopted in
some revisionist analysis, is untenable for multiple reasons.
349. See supra section II.A.1; supra note 135; infra section III.A.
350. See Koh, State Law?, supra note 6, at 1825–26, 1835 n.60; Neuman, supra note 6, at 372 n.6.
351. As discussed below, the analysis proposed in this Article does not adopt either a clear or
express statement requirement, or a requirement for legislative (or treaty) authorization. See supra
section II.B.2; infra section III.A. More fundamentally, the analysis proposed below focuses on the
content and character of the relevant rule of customary international law, rather than looking
exclusively to Legislative or Executive branch actions (such as congressional legislation or formal
executive suggestions).
352. See supra section I.B; supra section II.B.1.
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First, there is no reason to require express language or a clear statement
to authorize judicial application of customary international law in
congressional legislation, treaty provisions, or otherwise. Rather,
generally applicable standards for interpreting legislation and treaties353
should apply in determining whether the Legislative branch has provided
for judicial application of international law. That is the approach that best
ascertains Congress’s will,354 as well as the approach that has historically
been taken by U.S. courts; those courts have readily implied authorization
to apply international law rules from jurisdictional grants (like maritime
jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute)355 and from the content and
character of international law rules (in international agreements and under
customary international law).356 It is also the approach that serves best to
ensure that the intentions of Congress and the President with regard to
U.S. foreign relations are given full effect: a rule requiring clear or express
authorization by the political branches would necessarily frustrate those
intentions in a material number of cases.
Second, there is also no reason to conclude that only congressional
legislation (or a treaty), as distinguished from Executive branch actions,
can provide for judicial application of international law. Contrary to some
statements of the revisionist position,357 neither constitutional text and
structure nor judicial authority support a categorical requirement of
congressional authorization for application of international law by U.S.
courts. Instead, the extent to which Executive, as opposed to Legislative,
authorization may support judicial application of international law rules
depends on the distribution of foreign affairs authority between the
President and Congress under the Constitution. Detailed discussion of the

353. Standard canons of construction permit the interpretation of both legislation and treaties to
determine legislative intent in the absence of express language. BG Group PLC v. Republic of
Argentina, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (2014) (“[I]n the absence of explicit language in a treaty
demonstrating that the parties intended a different delegation of authority, our ordinary interpretive
framework applies.”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 206 (1993) (“Even where
congressional intent is unexpressed, however, a statute must be assessed according to its intended
scope.”).
354. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 637–38 (1992); John F. Manning,
Textualism and The Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 124–26 (2001).
355. See supra section II.B.1 (citing The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 287 (1815)
(admiralty jurisdiction over prize cases); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (ATS
jurisdiction over violations of law of nations)).
356. See supra section II.B.1 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432–33
(1964); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–38).
357. See supra section I.B; supra section II.A.2; Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note
4, at 354.
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subject is beyond the scope of this Article, but, however it is resolved, it
does not support the categorical rule suggested in some revisionist
analyses.
Consideration of the scope of the President’s foreign relations power
arises against the background of persistent controversy about the
distribution of the Nation’s foreign affairs powers between Congress and
the President. In Professor Corwin’s words, “[t]he Constitution . . . is an
invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy.”358 As a result, different conceptions of the allocation of foreign
affairs powers between the President and Congress have prevailed at
different times in the Nation’s history. In the early nineteenth century,
Congress’s authority in matters affecting U.S. foreign relations was
sweeping, and nearly exclusive.359 By the mid-twentieth century,
however, the President’s foreign relations powers were almost as broad as
those previously assigned to Congress.360 Most recently, the allocation of
foreign affairs authority has been less categorical, with the President’s
authority varying, depending on the extent of legislative support,
acquiescence, or opposition, and on historical practice regarding
particular issues.361
In practice, the Executive branch’s authority to independently
authorize judicial application of international law rules has been
recognized in a wide range of cases—including with respect to immunity
from U.S. judicial and legislative jurisdiction,362 claims settlement,363 and
seizures of private property.364 Moreover, many contemporary actions of
358. EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (5th ed. 1984);
see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (Framers’ intentions “must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh”).
359. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814) (Congress, not the President, has
constitutional authority to prescribe rules regarding expropriation of private property during war);
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) (President’s instructions to seize French
vessels conflicted with congressional legislation and were unlawful).
360. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“[V]ery delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations.”).
361. Compare Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 637, and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981), with Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015)
(“[J]udicial precedent and historical practice teach that it is for the President alone,” and not Congress,
“to make the specific decision of what foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.”).
362. See supra section II.A.1; supra note 132; supra section II.A.2; Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812).
363. See supra section II.A.2; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 336–37; Pink, 315 U.S. at 233.
364. See supra section II.B.2; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900) (relying on
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the Executive branch occur in fields where Congress has legislated, often
granting the President a substantial measure of executive authority;
alternatively, Congress often acquiesces in the Executive’s conduct of the
Nation’s foreign relations.365 In most cases, therefore, the issue will not
be whether the Executive branch, acting against Congress’s will, can
authorize application of a particular rule of international law, but whether
the Executive, acting with a measure of legislative support, can do so. As
a consequence, the President’s authority over aspects of U.S. foreign
relations—including the power to authorize judicial application of
particular rules of customary international law—will depend upon a close
analysis of legislative and executive actions (and inactions) in a specific
setting, just as the Court undertook in Sabbatino, Dames & Moore,
Garamendi, and other recent decisions.
In these circumstances, a categorical requirement for congressional
legislation (or a treaty) would obstruct and complicate the political
branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations by constraining the
manner in which those branches exercise their constitutional authority.
Likewise, such a requirement would disserve, rather than advance,
separation of powers objectives by refusing to give effect to the will of
the political branches in their conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Instead,
as U.S. courts have historically done, the proper approach requires a
careful assessment of the existence and character of both Legislative and
Executive branch authorization for judicial application of particular rules
of customary international law. As noted above, these issues are beyond
the scope of this Article, but they plainly provide for a broad scope of
Executive branch action even in the absence of express or implied
legislative authorization.366
B.

Self-Executing Versus Non-Self-Executing Federal Common Law

In determining whether the political branches have provided for
judicial application of a particular customary international law rule, the
approach proposed in this Article requires assessing considerations
Presidential Proclamation).
365. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of
the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1297–305 (1988); Rebecca Ingber, International Law
Constraints as Executive Power, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 49, 84–90 (2016).
366. The Tate Letter and Executive positions on other forms of immunity are obvious examples.
See supra section II.A.1; supra note 132. The Supreme Court’s refusal to give effect to the President’s
authorization for judicial application of international law in Medellín is a recent, and controversial,
example of limits on the scope of Executive authority. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 490–99, 523–
32 (2008).
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paralleling those relevant to determining the self-executing status of a
U.S. treaty or other international agreement. This standard is readily
applied and produces sensible results that are more consistent with
existing judicial authority than either the modernist or revisionist position.
It is true, as some commentators have observed, that the considerations
relevant to determining whether a treaty is self-executing have not been
consistently defined.367 These considerations can nonetheless be
identified with sufficient clarity to permit reliably determining when a
treaty provision is directly applicable in U.S. courts, as occurs routinely
in practice.368 As discussed below, a similar analysis can readily be
applied by analogy in the context of customary international law, much as
was done in Sabbatino and Sosa.369
Preliminarily, if the U.S. political branches have persistently objected
to a rule of customary international law, then the United States will not be
bound by the rule as a matter of international law,370 and U.S. courts will
have no reason (or authority) to apply that rule. This is no different from
cases where the United States has not ratified a treaty: in these instances,
there is no treaty or other rule of international law to be executed by U.S.
courts.371 Importantly, the question whether the United States has
persistently objected, and whether there is any rule of customary
international law to bind the United States, is an issue of federal law, not
state law.
Likewise, where the United States has not participated in the formation
of a rule of customary international law, that rule will ordinarily not be
directly applicable in U.S. courts. In these instances, there will be U.S.
acquiescence in the formation of the relevant international rule, but there
367. Carlos M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695,
695 (1995); Wu, supra note 178, at 579 (describing task of determining whether treaty is selfexecuting as “recipe for chaos in judicial clothing”); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002); see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)
§ 106 cmt. e.
368. See supra section II.A.2; section III.A. In any event, dissatisfaction with standards for
determining a treaty’s self-executing status can be addressed through refinement of these standards.
369. See supra section II.B.1.
370. See supra section II.A.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102 cmt. d.
371. This illustrates the importance of categorizing all rules of customary international law as
federal law: a state court decision, adopting a rule of customary international law opposed by the
federal political branches, could deny the United States persistent objector status, contradicting the
United States’s position as espoused by the federal political branches and subjecting the (entire)
United States to the rule. See supra section II.A.1. As discussed above, where federal courts, applying
federal law, determine that the political branches have not authorized judicial application of a rule of
customary international law, that determination would be binding on state courts, precluding their
application of that rule of law. See supra section II.A.1; supra section II.B.1.
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will (by hypothesis) be no evidence of any affirmative intention by the
political branches of the United States to authorize direct application of
the rule by U.S. courts. Absent such affirmative action by the political
branches, again determined as a matter of federal law, there will generally
be no basis for concluding that those branches have authorized application
of the rule in U.S. courts,372 and, absent such authorization, no basis for
judicial application of the rule. Instead, courts should apply a rule of
customary international law only when the U.S. political branches have
affirmatively provided for that rule to be self-executing.373
Assuming that the United States has participated in formation of a rule
of customary international law, there is no justification for adopting a
general presumption either for or against judicial application of that rule.
The weight of authority is against any presumption that all U.S. treaties
and international agreements are automatically either self-executing or
non-self-executing. Although some authorities have argued for a
presumption that all treaties are self-executing,374 the Supreme Court and
most other authorities have rejected that approach, declining to presume
generally that all treaties are either self-executing or non-selfexecuting.375 Instead, as discussed below, the better view (reflected in
judicial authority) is that the self-executing status of treaties depends on a
careful inquiry into the character and content of the specific treaty and on
other evidence of political branch intentions regarding the treaty’s status.
A similar approach is appropriate for determining whether a rule of
customary international law is self-executing. If treaties, formally made
in writing and ratified by the Senate, are not presumed to be selfexecuting, there is no reason that customary international law rules,
lacking comparable formality and precision, should be presumed to be
372. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 cmt. d (“Whether a treaty provision is self-executing is
normally determined by the intent or understanding of the U.S. treatymakers . . . .”); id. reporters’
note 2.
373. See supra section II.B.1.
374. Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Law: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 610 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of
Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 94, 94 n.22 (2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’
note 5 (“strong presumption” that “political branches” consider treaties self-executing if not
implemented).
375. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 512–14 (2008); id. at 551–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing multiple factors bearing on whether a treaty is self-executing); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 141(1)(a), (2)(a); see Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1946–2000, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 317 (David L. Sloss
et al. eds., 2011); Ingrid Wuerth, Medellín: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV
1, 3–5 (2009); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ note 3 (“[C]ase law has not established a
presumption for or against self-execution.”).
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self-executing. Conversely, if the political branches have undertaken an
international legal obligation on behalf of the Nation, but have not taken
legislative steps to implement compliance with that obligation, there
should be no presumption against judicial application of the rule.376
In determining whether the U.S. political branches have provided for
judicial application of a customary international law rule, the same basic
analysis employed for treaties should be used. That analysis provides a
workable means of ensuring that the political branches’ intentions, and the
international commitments of the United States, are given effect. It avoids
the categorical results of either the modernist or revisionist position, while
applying an analysis that, despite academic criticism,377 has functioned
satisfactorily in the context of treaties for two centuries.
Applying this analysis, a critical consideration in determining whether
a rule of customary international law is directly applicable in U.S. courts
is the content of the rule, just as the text of a treaty provision is central to
determining whether it is self-executing.378 The text or content of a treaty
generally provides direct evidence of the political branches’ intentions
with regard to the treaty’s self-executing character, and, for the same
reasons, the terms of a rule of customary international law generally
provide similar evidence of the self-executing character of that rule. Thus,
where the political branches assent to rules of customary international law
providing foreign states, heads of state, and foreign consuls with
immunity in national court proceedings,379 or prescribing a particular
choice of law rule,380 the terms and content of those rules themselves
evidence the intentions of the political branches that the rules apply
directly in U.S. courts (because, by their terms, those rules are addressed
to the judiciary).
Consistent with this, and as discussed above, U.S. decisions applying
jurisdictional immunities imposed by customary international law
emphasized that these rules were by their own terms “addressed to” the

376. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5 (“[I]f the Executive Branch has not
requested implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a strong
presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the political branches, and should
be considered self-executing by the courts.”).
377. See supra section II.A.2; supra note 164.
378. Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2014); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519;
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 649, 657 (2004); see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106
reporters’ note 2.
379. See supra section II.A.1; supra section II.B.1.
380. See supra section II.B.2 (discussing First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)).
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courts,381 while concluding that rules regarding recognition of
governments, new substantive causes of action, or the proper
circumstances for retaliation were “addressed to” the Legislative and
Executive branches.382 In each case, the content of the relevant rule of
customary international law itself evidences political branch authorization
of judicial application of the rule.
Other aspects of the content of treaty provisions, and by analogy, rules
of customary international law, also bear on their self-executing
character.383 Where a treaty provision is phrased in general or aspirational
terms,384 or provides for future implementing actions by individual
nations,385 then U.S. courts have generally held the treaty non-selfexecuting. Conversely, treaty provisions that are specific, mandatory, and
complete in character, not contemplating future implementing actions,
have typically been held self-executing.386 The same analysis applies to
customary international law, where courts have applied specific and
mandatory rules, as evidenced again by decisions involving foreign state,
head-of-state, and consular immunities.387 In contrast, U.S. courts have
refused to apply ill-defined, indefinite, or aspirational rules of customary
international law.388 That is made explicit in Sosa (which considered
381. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (act
of state doctrine addressed to courts); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)
(rules regarding judicial immunity addressed to courts); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808)
(rules regarding recognition of judgments and judicial jurisdiction addressed to courts)).
382. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815) (rules
regarding reciprocity or retaliation addressed to legislature); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110 (1814) (rules regarding seizure of property addressed to legislature)).
383. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 507 (“[W]e have also considered . . . the negotiation and drafting
history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”); id. at 549
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has found the provision’s subject matter of particular
importance.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (“[T]he Senate[’s] . . . ratification
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of
the document were not self-executing.”).
384. See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Other things being equal, where
rights are specific and readily enforceable, the treaty provision more likely ‘addresses’ the
judiciary.”).
385. See Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (“[The Convention] provides
that ‘[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary
measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.’”); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 315 (1829) (provision of treaty “seems to be the language of contract; and if it is, the ratification
and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature”).
386. See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 157 (1999) (“[g]iven the
Convention’s comprehensive scheme of liability rules and its textual emphasis on uniformity”).
387. See supra section II.A.1; supra section II.B.1.
388. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (requiring “a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
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whether an asserted rule is “a norm of international character accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th century paradigms we have recognized”),389 and
Sabbatino (which considered “the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law”).390
Furthermore, where a treaty would undermine the political branches’
foreign relations authority,391 or core aspects of the states’ sovereignty
over local social and political relations,392 courts have been reluctant to
hold the treaty self-executing. Conversely, where a treaty prescribes
commercial or procedural rules, applicable to relations between private
parties, it is more likely to be self-executing,393 particularly when those
rules concern international matters.394 The same analysis once more
applies with equal force to customary international law: where a rule of
international law would displace traditional state regulation of social
relations (e.g., race or religious discrimination) or political structure (e.g.,
right to vote), the rule is likely non-self-executing. In contrast, rules
establishing uniform international commercial regulations or dispute
resolution procedures are more likely self-executing. Again, the principal
428 (1964) (“[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government . . . in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates
customary international law.”).
389. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
390. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 106 reporters’ note 2 (“courts
will consider whether the treaty provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory” and whether “it
imposes obligations or creates authorities designed to have immediate effect, as opposed to
contemplating additional legal measures”).
391. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Would it create constitutionally
undesirable conflict with the other branches?”); see also Wu, supra note 178, at 587–97.
392. Compare Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532, Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089
(“[W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.”) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)), and Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing
Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 60–63 (2012), with Neilsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47,
52 (1929) (“[A]s the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the legislative power of
the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding
possible conflict with State legislation . . . .”).
393. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]oes it concern the adjudication of
traditional private legal rights such as rights to own property, to conduct a business, or to obtain civil
tort recovery? If so, it may well address itself to the judiciary.”); Hathaway et al, supra note 392, at
63 (treaties likely to be self-executing if they affect “economic or commercial relations between
individuals . . . [or] transnational liability or litigation”).
394. See generally Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (Warsaw Convention is selfexecuting); Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (Berne Convention and Paris
Convention are self-executing).
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focus is on the content and character of the relevant rule of international
law.
Another indicia of the political branches’ intentions regarding the status
of a treaty are statements during negotiation and ratification of the
treaty395 and, albeit less clearly, post-ratification statements.396 The same
considerations apply with equal force to political branch statements made
in connection with the formation and application of rules of customary
international law. Thus, formal statements by the Executive branch, like
the Tate Letter (concerning foreign sovereign immunity),397 or positions
taken by the Executive in litigation (as in Schooner Exchange, Bancec, or
Sosa)398 have been given substantial weight in determining whether to
apply a rule of customary international law.
In determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts have
also considered the status of related treaties.399 The same analysis applies
in the context of customary international law, where the existence of
reservations, understandings, or declarations with respect to treaties
prescribing similar international obligations should be directly relevant to
the status of a rule of customary international law. If the U.S. political
branches ratify a treaty guaranteeing particular rights (e.g., voting rights,
freedom of religion), but on the condition that the treaty is non-selfexecuting,400 then derivative or analogous rules of customary international
law should also be non-self-executing.401
A specialized grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction is also relevant
to authorization for judicial application of international law rules. As

395. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h (“[A]ccount must be taken of any statement by the
President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it to the Senate for consent or to the
Congress.”); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (“[W]hereas the Senate has issued declarations of non-selfexecution when ratifying some treaties, it did not do so with respect to the United Nations Charter.”);
see also Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 164, at 149–56.
396. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h, with Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 164,
at 156–57.
397. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Phillip B. Perlman,
U.S. Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Changing Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign
Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 Dep’t St. Bull. 984, 984–85 (1952).
398. See supra section II.B.1; supra section II.B.2; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004);
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); Schooner
Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
399. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15–20 (2010); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–14.
400. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 330–31.
401. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (“Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of
interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were
not self-executing.”).
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discussed above, specialized jurisdictional grants were present in prize
cases (admiralty jurisdiction), claims under the law of nations (Sosa and
the Alien Tort Statute), and choice of law rules for attribution of liability
to foreign states (Bancec and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).402
These specialized jurisdictional grants have, rightly, been interpreted as
impliedly providing for the federal courts to apply the body of law that
was most relevant and obviously applicable to claims falling within the
courts’ jurisdiction, in each instance leading to a conclusion that the
federal courts may (and must) apply relevant rules of customary
international law.403
Application of this analysis does not produce the categorical results of
either the modernist or revisionist positions. Instead, this analysis requires
more nuanced consideration of the content and character of particular
customary international law rules and the positions of the political
branches regarding those rules. In general, these considerations produce
unsurprising and sensible results, consistent with the weight of judicial
authority. Many rules of traditional customary international law—
concerning jurisdictional immunities and limitations,404 state succession
and attribution,405 and treaty validity and interpretation406—would likely
be directly applicable in U.S. courts. On the other hand, many “new” rules
of customary international law—involving emerging human rights
protections,407 limits on the use of force,408 and environmental
obligations409—would presumptively be non-self-executing. The decisive
questions in each case would be the content and character of the rule of
international law—whether new or old—and the intentions of the political
branches regarding that rule.

402. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing the prize cases and Alien Tort Statute); supra section
II.B.2 (discussing FSIA); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 712 (1832) (“[T]he law
giving jurisdiction to hear and determine this case not only authorises but requires us to decide it
according to the law of nations and the stipulations of the treaty.w”).
403. The existence of a specialized jurisdictional grant authorizing application of customary
international law in some categories of cases (e.g., prize cases; ATS) does not mean that U.S. courts
are authorized to apply all rules of customary international law. Rather, only those rules that fall
within the relevant subject matter and that are addressed to the courts, as distinguished from the
political branches, will ordinarily be applicable in judicial proceedings.
404. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 401–16, 421–23.
405. Id. §§ 208–10.
406. Id. §§ 311, 321, 325–26, 331.
407. Id. §§ 701–03.
408. Id. §§ 101 cmt. a, 905.
409. CRAWFORD, supra note 97, at 353–64.
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Finally, these results would limit the risks of judicial interference with
U.S. foreign relations. The international law rules that would be directly
applicable in U.S. courts would typically limit, rather than extend, judicial
actions against foreign states and their nationals,410 or provide uniform
federal rules for the application of other international law rules.411 In both
instances, there would generally be minimal risk of offense to foreign
states or interference with U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations by the political branches would be facilitated, by
ensuring that customary international law rules which they intended to be
applicable in U.S. courts were in fact applied, while precluding
application of such rules when it had not been authorized.
CONCLUSION
The application of customary international law by U.S. courts raises
intricate, and difficult, questions. None of the existing, categorical
answers to those questions is satisfactory. This Article proposes an
analysis to simplify and rationalize resolution of these issues. It does so
by treating all rules of customary international law—like all treaties and
other international agreements—as rules of federal law, subject to uniform
interpretation by federal courts. In addition, this analysis requires—again
as with treaties and other international agreements—an affirmative
showing that the federal political branches have, either expressly or
impliedly, provided for judicial application of customary international
law. This inquiry requires evaluation of the character and content of the
relevant international law rule, as well as statements of the political
branches, related international agreements, and the effect of particular
rules on traditional state regulatory authority and federal foreign relations
interests.
In contrast to existing analyses, the approach proposed in this Article
produces sensible results that safeguard both separation of powers and
federalism interests. On the one hand, this analysis ensures that the federal
political branches’ conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations is not
undermined by divergent or parochial state court interpretations of
customary international law. On the other hand, this analysis limits the
risks of interference by the federal courts in the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations and unauthorized judicial law-making by requiring an
affirmative showing that the U.S. political branches have provided for
410. Immunity from U.S. jurisdiction and presumptions against the extraterritorial application of
national law are good examples. See supra section II.A.1; section II.B.1.
411. Rules regarding treaty validity and interpretation and attribution of liability are good
examples. See supra section II.A.1.
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judicial application of particular rules of customary international law. In
so doing, the proposed analysis simplifies and rationalizes the internal
relationships between the several American sovereignties while
simultaneously strengthening American sovereignty in dealing with
external powers.

